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Abstract
This paper studies strategic information transmission in a nite horizon environment where,
each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We
show that communication in this dynamic environment is drastically di¤erent from in a one-shot
game. Our main result is that full information revelation is possible. We provide a constructive
method to build such fully revealing equilibria, and show that complicated communication, where
far-away types pool together, allows dynamic manipulation of beliefs to enable better information
release in the future. If communication is restricted to be monotonic partitional, full revelation is
impossible. Finally, we show how conditioning future information release on past actions improves
incentives for information revelation.
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Biased experts impede information transmission, which has serious consequences in many sit-
uations: Worse projects are nanced, benecial reforms are blocked, and rms may fail to reward
the most productive employees. The seminal analysis of strategic information transmission by
Crawford and Sobel (1982) has had a number of applications, ranging from economics and political
science, to philosophy and biology.1 In that paper, a biased and privately informed expert and a
decision-maker interact only once. The conict of interest results in coarse information revelation,
and in some cases, in no information revelation at all. There are, however, many environments in
which the expert and receiver interact repeatedly and information transmission is dynamic. Many
sequential decisions have to take place, and the decision-maker seeks the experts advice prior to
each decision.
We study strategic information transmission in a dynamic, nite-horizon extension of the Craw-
ford and Sobel setup. Each period, the expert sends a message and the decision-maker takes an
action. Only the expert knows the state of the world, which remains constant throughout the game.
We maintain all other features of the Crawford and Sobel (1982) environment, in particular the
conict of interest between the expert and decision-maker. The goal is to investigate the extent to
which conicts of interest prevent information transmission in multi-period interactions.
Our most surprising and di¢ cult-to-establish nding (Theorem 1) shows that full information
revelation is possible. We show this result in a challenging environment where the horizon is nite,
and both players are fully patient. The construction of the fully revealing equilibrium relies on
two key novel features. The rst is the use of what we call separable groups: the expert employs
a signaling rule in which far-apart types pool together initially, but eventually nd it optimal
to separate and reveal the truth. The second feature is to make advice contingent on actions:
the expert promises to reveal the truth later, but only if the decision-maker follows his advice
now; this initial advice, in turn, is designed to reward the expert for revealing information. In
a nutshell, communication in a multi-period interaction is facilitated via an initial signaling rule
that manipulates posteriors (in a way that enables precise information release in the future), initial
actions which reward the expert for employing this signaling rule, and trigger strategies which
reward the decision-maker for choosing these initial actions. Moving from a one-shot to nitely-
repeated game often leaves the qualitative feature of equilibria unchanged; we show here that nite
repetition has a drastic impact of the equilibrium nature of strategic communication.
We now explain in more detail our construction of a fully revealing equilibrium. We rst show
that it is possible to divide all states into separable groups. A separable group is a nite set of
states (types) which are su¢ ciently far apart that each type would rather reveal the truth, than
mimic any other type in his group. The experts initial signaling rule reveals the separable group
1For a survey with applications across disciplines see Sobel (2009).
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containing the truth; therefore, this creates histories after which it is common knowledge that the
decision-maker puts probability one on a particular separable group, at which point the types in
this group will nd it optimal to separate. The idea of initially pooling together far-away types,
who will then later have an incentive to separate, was rst proposed in Krishna and Morgan (2004);
they demonstrated how this could increase information revelation in dynamic games, and we have
pushed the idea further to demonstrate that if the initial groups are nite and chosen in the right
way, it is possible for the decision-maker to extract all information from a biased expert. The
division of all types into separable groups is quite delicate, because, given that there is a continuum
of types, we need to form a continuum of such groups. The expert anticipates that once he joins
a separable group, he will forgo his informational advantage. For the expert to join the separable
group containing his true type, we have to make sure that he does not want to mimic a nearby type
by joining some other separable group. This is done via our choice of initial actions, which ensure
that any future gain to the expert from mimicking some other type is o¤set by the initial cost.
These expert-incentivizing actions are not myopically optimal for the decision-maker, so we employ
trigger strategies: the expert (credibly) threatens to babble in the future if the decision-maker fails
to choose the actions that he recommends at the beginning. The nal part of the proof then shows
that we can design the separable groups and initial actions such that the decision-maker would
rather follow the experts initial advice, knowing that he will then eventually learn the exact truth,
than choose the myopically optimal action in the initial periods, knowing that he will then never
learn more than the separable group containing the truth.
In a follow-up section (Section 4.1), we adapt our construction to a continuous-time setting,
obtaining some more attractive results and generalizations. In particular, Theorem 1 proves that
full information revelation is possible when the decision-maker and expert are both perfectly patient
with quadratic-loss preferences, but only for some horizons, some priors (held by the decision-maker)
over the state space, and when the conict of interest between expert and decision-maker is small;
moreover, the welfare properties of the equilibrium are both di¢ cult to calculate, and in some
cases, not very appealing. Proposition 4 shows that with a trivial modication to the timeline,
and for the same set of priors covered by Theorem 1, our construction yields also a fully revealing
equilibrium for any pair of discount factors, so long as the decision-maker is at least as patient as
the expert. Our second main result, Theorem 2, shows that in a continuous-time setting with an
impatient expert (positive discount rate), a su¢ ciently patient decision-maker, and a su¢ ciently
long horizon, our fully revealing equilibrium works for nearly all priors over the state space; the
conict of interest may also be larger than in Theorem 1, and the proofs for the decision-maker do
not rely on quadratic-loss preferences. Moreover, the decision-makers average payo¤ loss (compared
to a full information setting) goes to zero as he becomes perfectly patient.
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We emphasize several additional di¤erences between dynamic and static communication games.
First, we emphasize that fully revealing equilibria cannot have the monotonic partitional structure
from Crawford and Sobel (1982): if attention is restricted to monotonic partition equilibria, learning
quickly stops. Moreover, we argue that non-monotonic equilibria can be strictly Pareto superior to
all dynamic monotonic equilibria. Welfare properties of equilibria also di¤er in a dynamic setup.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that, ex ante, both the expert and the decision-maker will (under
typical assumptions) prefer equilibria with more partitions. We provide an example that shows that
it is not necessarily the case for dynamic equilibria.2 We also present an example in which dynamic
monotonic partition equilibria can strictly Pareto-dominate the best static equilibrium, and an
example showing that non-monotonic equilibria can strictly Pareto dominate the best dynamic
monotonic equilibrium.
Our work shows that the nature of dynamic strategic communication is quite distinct from
its static counterpart. In the static case, because of the conict of interest between the decision-
maker and the expert, nearby expert types have an incentive to pool together, precluding full
information revelation. The single-crossing property also implies that at equilibrium, the action
is a monotonic step function of the state. These two forces make complex signaling (even though
possible) irrelevant. In the dynamic setup, the key di¤erence is that todays communication sets
the stage for tomorrows communication. Complex signaling helps in the dynamic setup, because
it can generate posteriors that put positive probability only on expert types who are so far apart,
they have no incentive to mimic each other; this is what enables fully revealing equilibria.
Related Literature
Crawford and Sobel (1982) is the seminal contribution on strategic information transmission.
That paper has inspired an enormous amount of theoretical work and myriads of applications.
Here we study a dynamic extension. Much of the previous work on dynamic communication has
focused on the role of reputation; see, for example, Sobel (1985), Morris (2001), and Ottaviani
and Sorensen (2006a, 2006b). Some other dynamic studies allow for multi-round communication
protocols, but with a single round of action(s). Aumann and Hart (2003) characterize geometrically
the set of equilibrium payo¤s when a long conversation is possible. In that paper, two players 
one informed and one uninformed play a nite simultaneous-move game. The state of the world
is nite, and players engage in direct (no mediator) communications, with a potentially innitely
long exchange of messages, before simultaneously choosing costly actions. In contrast, in our model,
only the informed party sends messages, the uninformed party chooses actions, and the state space
is innite. Krishna and Morgan (2004) add a long communication protocol to Crawford and Sobel
2A similar phenomenon occurs when communication is noisy, as shown in an example of the working paper version
of Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2007). In their example, a two-step partition Pareto dominates a three-step partition.
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(1982)s game, and Goltsman, H½orner, Pavlov and Squintani (2009) characterize such optimal
protocols.3 Forges and Koessler (2008a, 2008b) allow for a long protocol in a setup where messages
can be certiable. In all those papers, once the communication phase is over, the decision-maker
chooses one action. In our paper, there are multiple rounds of communication and actions (each
experts message is followed by an action of the decision-maker). The multiple actions correlate
incentives in a way that was not possible in these earlier works: the expert is able to condition his
advice on the decision-makers past behavior, and additionally, the decision-maker is able to choose
actions which reward the expert appropriately for following a path of advice that ultimately leads
to revelation of the true state.
In our setup, the dynamic nature of communication enables full information revelation. In
contrast, full information revelation is not possible in the dynamic setup of Anderlini, Gerardi,
and Laguno¤ (2012), who consider dynamic strategic communication in a dynastic game, and show
that if preferences are not fully aligned, full learning equilibria do not exist.4 Renault, Solan,
and Vielle (2011) examine dynamic sender-receiver games, and characterize equilibrium payo¤s (for
quite general preferences) for an innite-horizon model in which the state space is nite, the state
may change each period according to a stationary Markov process, and both players are patient.
In contrast, we assume a continuous state space with persistent information, and our focus is on
the possibility of full information revelation in nite time.5
Our model bears some similarities to models of static strategic communication with multiple
receivers. In those models the expert cares also about a sequence of actions, but in contrast to
our model, those actions are chosen by di¤erent individuals. An important di¤erence is that in
our model, the receiver cares about the entire vector of actions chosen; in those models, each
receiver cares only about his own action. This enables our use of trigger strategies, which we nd
is a necessary feature of equilibria with eventual full information revelation. Still, some of the
properties of the equilibria that we obtain also appear in the models with multiple receivers. For
example, our non-monotonic example presented in Section 3 resembles Example 2 of Goltsman and
3They examine the optimal use of a 3rd party, such as a mediator or negotiator, to relay messages. For the expert,
our model is equivalent to a one-shot model with a mediator: his expected payo¤ is the same whether he induces a
sequence of actions (at)Tt=1, or a probability distribution over these actions. For the decision-maker, our model makes
things easier in some ways (our expert can condition future advice on the DMs past actions), and more di¢ cult in
some ways (in our model, the decision-maker knows for sure that the initial actions hes asked to choose are nowhere
near the true state).
4 In their model, the state space is nite (0 or 1), and there is no perfectly informed player: each receiver gets
a signal about the state and a message from his predecessor, and then becomes the imperfectly informed advisor to
the next player.
5 Ivanov (2011) allows for a dynamic communication protocol in a setup where the expert is also initially unin-
formed, and the decision-maker controls the quality of information available to the expert. He employs separable
groups, but in a much di¤erent informational setting: His decision-maker has a device that initially reveals (to the
expert only) the separable group containing the truth, and contains a built-in threat to only reveal the exact state if
the expert reports this information truthfully. Compared to our model, this eliminates all incentive requirements for
the decision-maker, and imposes an additional cost on the expert (namely, he will fail to learn the truth himself) if
he fails to follow the prescribed strategy, thus weakening the required incentive constraints.
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Pavlov (2008). It is also similar to Example 2 in Krishna and Morgan (2004).6
Full information revelation is possible in other variations of the Crawford and Sobel (1982)
setup: When the decision-maker consults two experts as in Battaglini (2002), Eso and Fong (2008),
and Ambrus and Lu (2010); when information is completely or partially certiable, as in Mathis
(2008); and when there are lying costs and the state is unbounded as in Kartik, Ottaviani, and
Squintani (2007). In the case of multiple experts, playing one against the other is the main force
that supports truthful revelation. In the case of an unbounded state, lying costs become large and
support the truth. In the case of certiable information, one can exploit the fact that messages are
state-contingent to induce truth-telling. All these forces are very di¤erent from the forces behind
our fully revealing construction.
1 Motivating Example: An Impatient Financial Advisor
One of the most stark results of the static strategic communication game is that there is no equi-
librium with full information revelation. Although the state can take a continuum of values, the
expert sends at most nitely many signals to the decision-maker. That is, a substantial amount of
information is not transmitted.
In this example, we show how to construct a fully revealing equilibrium when the expert is
myopic, using just two stages. There are two essential ingredients of this example. First, the set
of types that pool together in the rst period are far enough apart that they can be separated in
the second period: that is, each possible rst-period message is sent by a separable group of types.
Second, each separable group induces the same optimal (for the decision-maker) rst-period action.
This implies that the expert does not care which group he joins (since a myopic expert cares only
about the 1st-period action, which is constant across groups).
Example 1 Fully revealing equilibrium with impatient experts (E = 0).
Suppose there is an expert (nancial advisor) and a decision-maker (an employee). The expert
knows the true state of the world ; which is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0; 1] and remains
constant over time: The playerspayo¤s in period t 2 f1; 2g depend on both the state, ; and on
the action chosen by the decision-maker, yt: More precisely, payo¤s in period t are given by
uEt (yt; ; b) =   (yt      b)2 and uDMt (y; ) =   (yt   )2 : (1)
where b > 0 is the experts bias. The expert is myopic, with E = 0; the construction works for
any discount factor for the decision-maker.
6Equilibria can be non-monotonic also in environments where the decision-maker consults two experts as in
Krishna and Morgan (2001).
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The expert employs the following signaling rule. In period 1, expert types f18 "; 38 +"; 48 +"; 1 "g
pool together and send the message m", for all " 2 [0; 18 ]. For all state pairs f18 + ~"; 78   ~"g with
~" 2 (0; 14); the expert sends a message m~". That is, we have two types of separable groups, indexed
by " and ~". Given this signaling rule, the best response of the decision-maker in period 1 is to
choose:
y1(m") =
1
8   "+ 38 + "+ 48 + "+ 1  "
4
= 0:5 for all " 2 [0; 1
8
];
y1(m~") =
1
8 + ~"+
7
8   ~"
2
= 0:5 for all ~" 2 (0; 1
4
):
In period 2, the expert reveals the truth, and so the decision-maker chooses an action equal to the
true state. After any out-of-equilibrium initial message, the decision-maker assigns equal probability
to all states, leading to action yout1 = 0:5. After any out-of-equilibrium second-period message, the
decision-maker assigns probability 1 to the lowest type in his information set (prior to the o¤-path
message), and accordingly chooses an action equal to this type.
We now argue that this is an equilibrium for any b < 116 :
First, notice that all messages (even out-of-equilibrium ones) induce the same action in period
1. Hence, the expert is indi¤erent between all possible rst-period messages if he puts zero weight
on the future. So, in particular, a myopic expert will nd it optimal to send the rightmessage,
following the strategy outlined above. Now consider, for example, the history following an initial
message m": The decision-makers posterior beliefs assign probability 14 to each of the types in
1
8   "; 38 + "; 48 + "; 1  "
	
: The experts strategy at this stage is to tell the truth: so, if he sends a
message that he is type k 2 18   "; 38 + "; 48 + "; 1  "	 ; then the decision-maker will believe that
k is the true state, and accordingly will choose action k; if the expert deviates to some o¤-path
message, then the decision-maker will assign probability 1 to the lowest type in his information set,
1
8   "; and accordingly choose action 18   ": Therefore, to prove that the expert has no incentive to
deviate, we need only show that each expert type k 2 18   "; 38 + "; 48 + "; 1  "	 would rather tell
the truth, than mimic any of the other types in his group. Type k prefers action k to k0 whenever
  (k   k   b)2     k0   k   b2 ,  k0   k  k0   k   2b  0
i.e., whenever k0 < k; or whenever k0 > k + 2b: So in particular, to make sure that no type in
1
8   "; 38 + "; 48 + "; 1  "
	
wishes to mimic any other type in this group, it is su¢ cient to make
sure that every pair of types are at least 2b apart. Since the closest-together types in the group, 38 +"
and 48 + "; are separated by
1
8 ; we conclude that the group is separable whenever
1
8 > 2b, b < 116 :
And similarly after messages me":
This construction does not apply with a more patient expert (E > 0); because it does not
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provide a forward-looking expert with incentives to join the rightseparable group. For example,
consider type 38 ; and suppose that b =
1
16 : The truthful strategy is to reveal group f18 ; 38 ; 48 ; 1g
in period 1; and the tell the truth in period 2; inducing actions (y1; y2) =
 
1
2 ;
3
8

: However such
strategy cannot be part of an equilibrium if E > 0: The best deviation for  = 38 is to mimic
type 38 +
1
16 initially claiming to be part of the group

1
8   116 ; 38 + 116 ; 48 + 116 ; 78   116
	
; and then
subsequently claiming that the true state is 38 +
1
16 thereby inducing actions (y1; y2) =
 
1
2 ;
3
8 +
1
16

:
This deviation then leads to no change in the rst-period action, but the 2nd-period action is now
equal to type 38s bliss point,
3
8 +
1
16 . When E > 0 we need to provide the expert with better
incentives to join the rightseparable group: since  prefers  + bs action in the future, he must
prefer his own action now. This is much more complex, but in Section 4, we show how to construct
such separation-inducing actions.
2 The Model
We extend the classic model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to a dynamic setting. There are two
players, an expert (E) and a decision-maker (DM), who interact for nitely many periods. The
expert knows the true state of the world  2 [0; 1]; which is constant over time and is distributed
according to the c.d.f. F; with associated density f . Both players care about their discounted
payo¤ sum: when the state is  and the decision-maker chooses actions yT = (y1; ::; yT ) in periods
1; 2; :::; T; payo¤s are given by:
expert: UE(yT ; ; b) = Tt=1
t 1
E u
E(yt; ; b)
DM: UDM (yT ; ) = Tt=1
t 1
DMu
DM (yt; )
where b > 0 is the experts bias and reects a conict of interest between the players, and
E ; DM are the playersdiscount factors. We assume that uE(yt; ) and uDM (yt; ; b) satisfy the
conditions imposed by Crawford and Sobel (1982): for i = DM;E; ui () is twice continuously
di¤erentiable, ui1(y; ) = 0 for some y and u
i
11 () < 0 (so that ui has a unique maximizer y for
each pair (; b)), and that ui12 () > 0 (so that the best action from an informed players perspective
is strictly increasing in ): Most of our main results will make the more specic assumption that
preferences are quadratic, as given by (1) :
At the beginning of each period t, the expert sends a (possibly random) message mt to the
decision-maker. The decision-maker then updates his beliefs about the state, and chooses an action
yt 2 R that a¤ects both playerspayo¤s. Let yDM () and yE() denote, respectively, the decision-
makers and the experts most preferred actions in state ; we assume that for all ; yDM () 6= yE();
so that there is a conict of interest between the players regardless of the state.
The decision-maker observes his payo¤s only at the end of the game. (If the decision-maker
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could observe his payo¤ each period, the problem would be trivial, as he could simply invert his
payo¤ to determine the true state : As usual, we could alternatively assume stochastic payo¤s, with
su¢ cient noise that the decision-maker is unable to learn anything about the state from observing
his payo¤ realizations).
A strategy prole  = (i)i=E;DM , species a strategy for each player. Let ht denote a history
that contains all the reports submitted by the expert, mt 1 = (m1; :::;mt 1), and all actions chosen
by the decision-maker, yt 1 = (y1; :::; yt 1); up to stage t. The set of all feasible histories at t
is denoted by Ht. A behavioral strategy for the expert, E ; consists of a sequence of signaling
rules that map [0; 1]Ht to a probability distribution over reportsM. Let q(m j; ht ) denote the
probability that the expert reports message m at history ht when his type is . A strategy for the
decision-maker, DM , is a sequence of maps from Ht to actions. We use yt(m jht ) 2 R to denote
the action that the decision-maker chooses at ht given a report m: A belief system, , maps Ht to
the set of probability distributions over [0; 1]: Let (jht) denote the decision-makers beliefs about
the expertss type after a history ht: A strategy prole  and a belief system  is an assessment.
We seek strategy proles and belief systems that form Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, (PBE).
In the paper we use the terminology as follows.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is called babbling if for all m with q(m j; ht ) > 0; all  2 [0; 1], all
ht and t; we have that yt(m jht ) = y^:
In other words, we call an equilibrium babbling if the same action is induced, with probability
one, for all states  2 [0; 1] and all t 2 T:
Denition 2 We call a signaling rule q uniform if q(m j; ht ) is uniform, with support on [i; i+1]
if  2 [i; i+1]:
Denition 3 A partition equilibrium is one in which, at each period t and history ht; the expert
employs only uniform signaling rules.
In other words, in a partition equilibrium, the expert follows a pure strategy in which, for any
message m, the set of types sending message m is connected (an interval).
Denition 4 An equilibrium is fully revealing if there exists T^  T such that for all  2 [0; 1]; and
all histories along the equilibrium path, the expert reveals the true state with probability one by time
T^ ; and accordingly yt() = yDM () 8t  T^ :
We rst briey summarize the ndings of the one-shot strategic information transmission game
of Crawford and Sobel (1982), in which uniform signaling rules are the canonical form of commu-
nication. We then study properties of uniform signaling in our dynamic setup.
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2.1 Uniform Signaling: The Canonical Static Communication
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that in a one-shot strategic information transmission game, all
equilibria are equivalent to partition equilibria: the expert follows a pure strategy in which intervals
of types pool together, by sending the same message, inducing actions which are increasing step
functions of the state. Communication is then coarse; even though the state  takes a continuum
of values, only nitely many di¤erent actions are induced.
The reasons behind this result can be summarized as follows. Fix an equilibrium of the one-shot
game and let y() denote an action induced when the state is . The conict of interest between
the expert and the decision-maker implies that at most nitely many actions can be induced at
equilibrium. Together with the single-crossing condition and the fact that uE () is strictly concave
in y; this implies that equilibrium actions are an increasing step function of the state. Importantly,
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that, without loss of generality, the actions induced at equilibrium
can be taken to arise from uniform signaling rules. This result follows from the observation that all
messages inducing the same action y can be replaced by a single message. Therefore, more complex
signaling rules play no role in the static setup.
2.2 Uniform Signaling: A Special Kind of Dynamic Communication
We now focus on simple partitional communication protocols (uniform signaling) and study their
properties in our dynamic setup. We show two results. The rst result is that with monotonic
partition equilibria, the decision-maker never learns the truth:
Proposition 1 For all horizons T , there exist no fully revealing monotonic partition equilibria.
This result follows almost immediately from Crawford and Sobel (1982). A short sketch of the
argument is as follows. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a fully revealing monotonic
partition equilibrium. Then, there exists a period T^  T in which the last subdivision occurs, with
yt() = y
DM () for all t  T^ . Then, the incentive constraint at time bT for type  to not mimic
type  + " is
1 +  + 2 + :::+ T T^ 1

uE
 
yDM () ; ; b
  1 +  + 2 + :::+ T T^ 1uE  yDM ( + ") ; ; b
and similarly for type  + ". These conditions are equivalent to the static equilibrium conditions
in Crawford and Sobel (1982), who proved that they imply that at most nitely many actions can
be induced at an equilibrium of a static game, a contradiction to full revelation.
We now proceed to show that if all static equilibria are babbling, then all dynamic monotonic
partition equilibria are equivalent to babbling.
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Proposition 2 If all static equilibria are equivalent to the babbling equilibrium, then all dynamic
monotonic partition equilibria are equivalent to babbling.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that the logic of the arguments used to establish Propositions 1 and 2 applies also to an
innite horizon environment.
Now we move on to show that dynamic monotonic partition equilibrium can Pareto-dominate
all equilibria of the one-shot game. In Appendix B, we construct a two-period example in which
E = DM = 1; the state  is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]; and preferences are given by (1) ; with
b = 112 : In the most informative static equilibrium, the state space is partitioned into two pieces,
0; 13
[ 13 ; 1 ; inducing actions 16 and 46 : On the other hand, there exists a partition equilibrium of
the two-period game in which the state space is divided ultimately in three sub-intervals, [0; 0:25][
[0:25; 0:45833] [ [0:458 33; 1], and which is (ex-ante) strictly Pareto superior to repetition of the
static equilibrium.
However, in dynamic settings it is also possible to have equilibria with more partitions that
are inferior to ones with less (we present an example of such an equilibrium in Appendix C). This
happens because a larger ultimate number of partitions may require extensive pooling earlier on,
inducing overall lower welfare. This nding is in contrast to Crawford and Sobel (1982), who
show that under their Condition M (essentially a unique equilibrium for each partition size N),
equilibria can be easily Pareto ranked: both the expert and the decision-maker prefer (ex ante) the
equilibrium with the highest number of partitions.7 Our ndings suggest that Pareto comparisons
in dynamic cases are less straightforward, even if we restrict attention to monotonic partitional
equilibria.
We proceed to study the role of complex signaling in our dynamic game.
3 An Example with Complex Signaling and Dynamic Information
Revelation
In this section, we present an example in which the expert employs a complex signaling rule, which
induces non-monotonic actions. In this example, the bias is so severe that in a static setting, all
equilibria would be babbling. We show that even in these extreme bias situations, some information
can be revealed with just two rounds. This equilibrium has the feature that the decision-maker
learns the state quite precisely when the news is either horric or terric, but remains agnostic for
7The equilibrium with the largest number of partitions is the only equilibrium that satises the no incentive to
separate(NITS) condition (Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008)).
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intermediate levels. Finally we show that for a range of biases, this non-monotonic equilibrium is
Pareto superior to all monotonic ones.
Example 2 Dynamic equilibria can be non-monotonic
Consider a two period game where E = DM = 1, types are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and
preferences are given by (1). We will construct an equilibrium with the following piano teacher
interpretation: a childs parent (the decision-maker) wants the amount of money he spends on
lessons to correspond to the childs true talent ; whereas the piano teacher (expert) wants to
inate this number. In our equilibrium, parents of children who are at either the bottom or top
extreme of the talent scale get the same initial message, you have an interesting child (m1(1)
below), and then nd out in the second period whether interestingmeans great (m2(3)) or awful
(m2(1)); parents of average children are told just that in both periods. More precisely, let the expert
use the following signaling rule:
In period 1, expert types in [0; ) [ (; 1] send message m1(1) with probability 1, and types in
[; ] send message m1(2) with probability 1. In period 2, the expert adopts the following signaling
rule: types in [0; ) send message m2(1), types in [; ] send a message m2(2), and types in (; 1] send
m2(3) (all with probability 1). With this signaling rule, the optimal actions for the decision-maker in
period 1 are y1(1) =
2 2+1
2( +1) ; y1(2) =
+
2 ; in period 2, they are y2(1) =

2 ; y2(2) =
+
2 ; y2(3) =
1+
2 .
After any out-of-equilibrium message, the decision-maker assigns equal probability to all states in
[; ]; and so will choose action yout = +

2 : With these out-of equilibrium beliefs, no expert type
has any incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium message.
In order for this to be an equilibrium, type  must be indi¤erent between message sequences
A   m1(1);m2(1) and B   m1(2);m2(2):
 
 
2   2 + 1
2(    + 1)      b
!2
 


2
     b
2
=  2

 + 
2
     b
2
(2)
and type  must be indi¤erent between message sequences B and C   m1(1);m2(3) :
 
 
2   2 + 1
2(    + 1)  
   b
!2
 

1 + 
2
     b
2
=  2

 + 
2
     b
2
: (3)
At t = 2 it must also be the case that type  prefers m2(1) to m2(3), and the reverse for type :
that is  ( 2     b)2   (1+

2     b)2 and  (1+

2     b)2   ( 2     b)2: The global incentive
compatibility constraints, requiring that all types  <  prefer sequence A to B and that all types
 >  prefer C to B; reduce to a requirement that the average induced action be monotonic, which
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is implied by indi¤erence constraints (2) ; (3) :8
A solution of the system of equations (2) and (3) gives an equilibrium if 0   <   1: We
solved this system numerically, and found that the highest bias for which it works is b = 0:256: Here,
the partition cuto¤s in our equilibrium are given by  = 0:0581;  = 0:9823. The corresponding
optimal actions for period 1 are y1(1) = 0:253; y1(2) = 0:52; and for period 2 they are y2(1) = 0:029;
y2(2) = 0:52; y2(3) = 0:991: Note that while the rst period action is non-monotonic, the average
action y = y1+y22 is still weakly increasing in the state. Ex ante payo¤s are  0:275 for the expert,
and  0:144 for the decision-maker.
Recall that in a one-shot game with quadratic preferences, the only equilibrium is the babbling
one whenever b > 14 : Proposition 2 implies that at b = 0:256; if we restricted attention to monotonic
partition equilibria, we would again nd only a babbling equilibrium, in which the decision-maker
chooses action yB = 0:5 in both periods: this yields ex-ante payo¤s of  0:298 to the expert,  0:167
to the decision-maker, strictly worse than in our above construction.
Our example therefore illustrates how allowing for non-monotonic equilibria can both increase
the amount of information revelation, and can also strictly Pareto-dominate the best static equi-
librium. By pooling together the best and the worst states in period 1, the expert is willing to
reveal in period 2 whether the state is very good or very bad. It also has the following immediate
implication:
Proposition 3 There exist non-monotonic equilibria that are Pareto superior to all monotonic
partition equilibria.
We now move on to our rst main result, showing that our dynamic setup correlates the incen-
tives of the expert and decision-maker in such a way that full information revelation is possible.
4 Learning the Truth when the Expert is Patient
When the expert is patient rather than myopic, getting him to reveal the truth is much more
complicated, as we previewed in Section 1. In this section, we construct a fully revealing equilibrium
for the quadratic preferences specied in (1) : The equilibrium relies on two main tools: separable
groups, and trigger strategies. These tools have no leverage in single-round communications, but
are powerful in dynamic communications.
8Rearranging (3) ; the LHS is greater than the RHS for type  (so he prefers C to B) i¤ 
     y1(1)+y2(3)
2
  y1(2)

> 0; so we need
y1(1)+y2(3)
2
> y1(2) for this to hold 8 > : This is implied by (3) : adding
2

y1(1)+y2(3)
2
     b
2
to both sides and factoring yields
 
y1(2)      b
2  y1(1)+y2(3)
2
     b
2
=

y1(1) y2(3)
2
2

0; so we need
y1(2)      b   y1(1)+y2(3)2      b ; since y1(2) <  + b; this implies y1(2)  y1(1)+y2(3)2 ; as desired.
And similarly at .
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The equilibrium works as follows: in each period, the expert recommends an action to the
decision-maker. Initially, each action is recommended by nitely many (at most four) expert types,
who then subdivide themselves further into separable groups of two with an interim recommenda-
tion. If the decision-maker chooses all initial actions recommended by the expert, then the expert
rewards him by revealing the truth in the nal stage of the game, recommending an action y() = :
If the decision-maker rejects the experts early advice, then the expert babbles for the rest of the
game, and so the decision-maker never learns more than the separable group containing the truth.
We provide here an outline of how we construct fully revealing equilibria for quadratic prefer-
ences. This is followed by the statement of our rst main theorem, with full proof details given in
Appendix D.
Equilibrium Outline: Separable Groups
Rather than having intervals of types pool together, we construct pairs of far-away types (part-
ners) who pool together in the initial periods. The advantage is that once the expert joins one of
these separable groups, revealing the two possible true states to the decision-maker, we no longer
need to worry about him mimicking nearby types: his only options are to tell the truth, or to mimic
his partner. Of course, an important part of the proof is to ensure that each expert type wants
to join the right separable group. For a myopic expert, this is straightforward: if the expert
cares only about the rst-period action, then to make him join the right group, it is su¢ cient that
the rst-period action be constant across groups. (In fact, the myopic expert result relied only on
separable groups, without the need for trigger strategies: we were able to group types such that
the (constant) action recommended by each group was equal to the average type within the group,
i.e. so that it coincided with the decision-makers myopically optimal choice). For a patient expert,
the construction is signicantly more involved, as it must take dynamic incentives into account.
In particular, the actions induced in the initial stages cannot be at: if this were the case, then
an expert who cares about the future would simply join whichever separable group leads to the
best future action: Hence, for a patient expert, we need to construct initial action functions which
provide appropriate incentives: if type  knows that some type 0 will get a more favorable action
in the revelation phase, then type s group must induce an initial action which is more favorable
to type  than that induced by (0)s group.
Equilibrium Outline: Strategies
Before we proceed with the sketch, it is useful to simplify notation and work with a scaled type
space by dividing all actions and types by b. When we say that type  2 [0; 1b ] recommends u()
in period 1, for disutility (u()     1)2, we mean that (in the unscaled type space) type b
recommends action u()b; for disutility (u()b  b  b)2 = b2 (u()     1)2.
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We rst partition the scaled type space [0; 1b ] into four intervals, with endpoints [0; 1; 2; 3;
1
b ].
The separable groups are as follows: at time t = 0; each type  2 [0; 1] pools with a partner
g() 2 [2; 3] to send a sequence of recommendations (u1(); u2()) ; and then reveal the truth at
time t = 2 i¤ the decision-maker followed both initial recommendations. Each type  2 [1; 2]
initially pools with a partner h() 2 [3; 1b ] to recommend a sequence (v1(); v2()) ; then revealing
the truth at time T    ( < T   2 a time parameter to be determined) i¤ the expert followed
their advice.9 For the purpose of this outline, take the endpoints 1; 2; 3 as given, along with
the partner functions g : [0; 1] ! [2; 3]; h : [1; 2] ! [3; 1b ]; and recommendation functions
u1; u2; v1; v2. In the appendix, we derive the parameters and functions that work, and provide the
full details of how to construct fully revealing equilibria.
We now describe the strategy for the expert and for the decision-maker. For notational purposes
it is useful to further subdivide the expert types into three groups: I, II, and III.
At time t = 0, there are then three groups of experts. Group I consists of types I 2 [1; 2]
with their partners h
 
I
 2 3; 1b . Group II consists of all types II 2 [0; 1] whose initial
recommendation coincides with that of a Group I pair, together with their partners g(II) 2 [2; 3]:
Group III consists of all remaining types III 2 [0; 1] and their partners g(III) 2 [2; 3]: In other
words, we divided the types in intervals [0; 1] [ [2; 3] into two groups, II and III; according to
whether or not their initial messages coincide with that of a group I pair.
The timeline of the experts advice is as follows:
# # # # #
Phase 1 (t = 0) Phase 2 (t = 20) Phase 3 (t = 2a) Phase 4 (t = 2) Phase 5 (T   )
Group I : v1
Groups II; III : u1
Group I :
switch to v2
Groups II; III :
switch to u2
Groups II; III :
reveal the truth
Group I :
reveal the truth
Figure 1: Timeline
where 0 < 0  a < 1 are specied in the appendix (Section D.2.1).
In words: in the initial phase, types in Group I recommend v1: v1
 
I

= v1
 
h
 
I

, while
types in Groups II and III recommend the action u1: u1
 
II

= u1
 
g
 
II

. Importantly, the
recommendations for the types in Groups I and II coincide (while Group III recommendations
do not coincide with those of any Group I pair): for every I in Group I, there exists II in Group
II with v1
 
I

= u1
 
II

. This is why, for ease of exposition, we have a subdivision into Groups
II and III; upon receiving a recommendation v1(I) = u1(II); the decision-maker believes that it
could have come from any of the types in

I ; h
 
I

; II ; g
 
II
	
(see footnote 25 in Section D.2.1
for why this is needed). At time t = 20, group I pairs fI ; h(I)g change their recommendation
9Note that u1; u2; v1; v2 are functions of ; and that in our construction, the experts messages (recommenda-
tions) are equal to the actions that he wants the decision-maker to take, and the decision-maker can then infer the
experts separable group from the message.
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to v2(I) = v2(h(I)); while Groups II and III continue to follow the recommendation function
u1 (that is, they do not yet change their advice). Thus, at this stage, the decision-maker learns
whether he is facing a Group I, II or III pair. At time t = 2a  20, group II and III pairs
switch to the recommendation function u2; where a may depend on the specic pair:10 Group I
continues to follow the recommendation function v2; revealing no further information at this stage.
At time t = 2, group II and III pairs separate: each type II or III in [0; 1] sends a message
equal to his type (thus revealing the truth for the nal T   2 periods), and similarly their partners
g(II); g(III) send messages equal to their own types. At time T  > 2, Group I pairs fI ; h(I)g
separate, with type I recommending action I and type h(I) recommending h(I) for the nal
 periods. It should be noted that the times at which the decision-maker is instructed to change
his action (20; 2a; T   ) are not necessarily integers in our construction. In a continuous-time
setting, this clearly poses no problem; in discrete time, we can deal with integer constraints via
public randomization and/or scaling up the horizon, as explained in the Appendix (D.2.6).
The decision-makers strategy is to follow all on-path recommendations. An o¤-path recom-
mendation at time t = 0 is treated as a mistake coming from the pair f0; g(0)g; and subsequent
o¤-path recommendations are simply ignored as errors (full details at the start of Section D.1 in
the Appendix).
To summarize: In the initial phase, separable groups are formed. Each expert type sends a
recommendation sequence of the form
0B@ v1(I)| {z }
20 periods
; v2(
I)| {z }
T  20 periods
1CA or
0B@ u1(i)| {z }
2a periods
; u2(
i)| {z }
2(1 a) periods
1CA ;
with i 2 fII; IIIg; and such that for all I 2 [1; 2] there exists II 2 [0; 1] with v1(I) = u1(II):
During these phases, the decision-maker is able to infer the separable group containing the experts
true type, but, rather than choosing the corresponding myopically optimal action, he chooses
the actions u1; u2; v1; v2 recommended by the expert. These action functions are constructed to
provide the expert with incentives to join the right separable group at time 0. The nal phases
are the revelation phases: the separable groups themselves separate, revealing the exact truth to
the decision-maker, provided that he has followed all of the experts previous advice; any deviation
results in babbling by the expert during the revelation phase.
Incentivizing the Expert
Finally, we briey explain the construction of the functions (u1; u2) and (v1; v2) ; and the cor-
responding partner functions g; h (and endpoints 1; 2; 3); which are given parametrically in the
Appendix (see equations (14) ; (15)). For the expert, three sets of constraints must be satised:
10 In Proposition D3 in the appendix, we describe Group II; III types and their recommendations parametri-
cally, as functions of a variable a: Then, in Lemma D7.1, we choose a to ensure the desired overlap of the u1; v1
recommendation functions.
16
Expert Local IC:
The rst set of constraints can be thought of as local incentive compatibility constraintsthat
is, those applying within each type s interval [i; i+1]: These (dynamic) incentive compatibility
constraints ensure that, say, the agent  2 [0; 1] prefers to induce actions u1() (for 2a periods);
u2() (for 2(1   a) periods); and then reveal his type  for the nal T   2 periods; than e.g. to
follow the sequence
 
u1(
0); u2(0); 0

prescribed for some other type 0 in the same interval [0; 1]
(and analogously within each of the other three intervals). For types  2 [0; 1]; this boils down to
a requirement that u1; u2 satisfy the following di¤erential equation,
2au
0
1() (u1()     1) + 2(1  a)u02() (u2()     1) = T   2 (4)
and that the averageaction, 2au1() + 2(1 a)u2() + (T  2); be weakly increasing in . We
provide a more detailed explanation and solution of this equation in the Appendix, Section D.3.1,
and derive similar equations for the other three intervals.
Note that a longer revelation phase (that is, an increase in the RHS term (T  2) in (4)) requires
a correspondingly larger distortion in the action functions u1; u2 : if the expert anticipates a lengthy
phase in which the DMs action will match the true state (whereas the experts bliss point is to the
right of the truth), then it becomes more di¢ cult in the initial phase to provide him with incentives
not to mimic the advice of types to his right. This is why a longer horizon does not trivially imply
better welfare properties.
Expert Global IC:
The next set of constraints for the expert can be thought of as globalincentive compatibility
constraints, ensuring that no expert type wishes to mimic any type in any other interval. In the
appendix, we show that this boils down to two additional requirements: each endpoint type 1; 2; 3
must be indi¤erent between the two equilibrium sequences prescribed for his type (for example, type
1 must be indi¤erent between sequences
0B@u1(1)| {z }
2a
; u2(1)| {z }
2(1 a)
; 1|{z}
T 2
1CA and
0B@v1(1)| {z }
20
; u2(1)| {z }
T  20
; 1|{z}

1CA), and
the averageaction must be either continuous or jump up at each endpoint (see Appendix Lemma
D.3.2, with further details in Section D.3.1).
Expert Separation:
The nal constraint requires that each pair of types indeed be separable, that is, su¢ ciently far
apart that each type would rather tell the truth than mimic his partner. In our rescaled type space
with quadratic preferences, this requires choosing partner functions g; h satisfying jg()  j  2
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and jh()  j  2; which we do in the appendix (Section D.1.2). It turns out to be very tricky to
satisfy the global incentive compatibility constraints together with the local constraints: it in fact
requires a minimum of two distinct actions prior to the revelation phase (this is why e.g. Group
III pairs must change their recommendation from u1 to u2 at time 2a; even though doing so
reveals no further information), and that the type space be partitioned into a minimum of four
intervals. Moreover, for any partition into four intervals, there is in fact only one partner function
g : [0; 1] ! [2; 3] that works, and we believe that there is no partition which would allow
for expert-incentivizing action functions which are myopically optimal from the decision-makers
perspective. This is why our construction relies on trigger strategies: the expert only reveals the
truth if the decision-maker follows all of his advice.
We graph the equilibrium actions u1; v1 in the left-most graph, the u2; v2 in the middle graph,
and the average action for b = 160: 885 and T = 4 :
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Incentivizing the decision-maker:
Suppose that the expert recommends an action u1(); which the decision-maker believes could
only have come from types ; g(): If the decision-maker follows the recommendation, then he
expects the expert to switch his recommendation to u2() at time 2a; and then recommend the
true state  for the nal T   2 periods. If the decision-maker assigns probabilities p; 1   p to
types ; g(); then this yields an expected disutility of
p

2a (u1()  )2 + 2(1  a) (u2()  )2

+(1 p)

2a (u1()  g())2 + 2(1  a) (u2()  g())2

(noting that disutility in the nal T   2 periods is zero). The problem is that the initial rec-
ommendations u1(); u2() do not coincide with the decision-makers myopically optimal action,
y()  p+(1 p)g():We therefore employ trigger strategies: the expert only reveals the truth
in the nal stage if the decision-maker follows his recommendations at the beginning of the game.
If the decision-maker ever rejects his advice, then the expert babbles for the rest of the game, and
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so the decision-makers disutility is at best
T 
264p 
0B@p + (1  p)g()| {z }
y()
  
1CA
2
+ (1  p) 
0B@p + (1  p)g()| {z }
y()
  g()
1CA
2375
So, for the equilibrium to work for the decision-maker, we need to make sure that the benet
to learning the exact state, rather than just the separable group containing it, is large enough to
compensate him for the cost of following the experts initial recommendations, rather than deviating
to the myopically optimal actions. This is what limits the priors for which our construction works,
and imposes the upper bound b = 161 on the bias (see Appendix D.3.2, end of rst paragraph). The
construction works for the expert 8b < 116 (see appendix, end of proof of Proposition D2 in Section
D.1.2).
Beliefs
We assume that the decision-maker is Bayesian: if he believes that the experts rst-period
messages are given by a function M : [0; 1]! R; with the property that
M(x) = M(p(x))
for all x in some interval [x; x] and p : [x; x] ! [0; 1]n[x; x] some continuous di¤erentiable function
(i.e., types x and p(x) are partnerswho follow the same messaging strategy), then, after receiving
the message m = M(x) = M(p(x)); the decision-makers beliefs satisfy
Pr(xjm)
Pr(p(x)jm) = lim!0
F (x+ )  F (x )
F (p(x+ ))  F (p(x )) =
f(x)
f(p(x))
 1p0(x)
 (5)
This says that the likelihood of type x relative to p(x) is equal to the unconditional likelihood
ratio (determined by the prior F ); times a term which depends on the shape of the p-function,
in particular due to its inuence on the size of the interval of p-types compared to their partner
interval, [x; x] :11
We now state our main result:
Theorem 1 Suppose that E = DM = 1 and that the preferences of the expert and of the decision-
maker are given by (1) : For any bias b  161 ; there is an open set of priors F ,12 and a horizon T ;
for which a fully revealing equilibrium exists whenever T  T :
11To understand this formula, consider an example in which F is uniform and p () is linear, say p(x) = +x: In
this case, the interval [p(x); p(x)] is  times as large as the interval [x; x] ; so intuitively, it is as if the message sent
by type x is sent by  copiesof type p(x) : therefore, the decision-makers beliefs assign  times as much weight to
type p(x) as to type x; which is precisely what our formula says. Beliefs are assigned analogously after period 1.
12This is slightly strengthened from previous versions of the paper, which claimed only an innite (rather than
open) set of priors.
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The details of the construction can be found in the Appendix.
Substantively, this Theorem establishes an unexpected nding: even with a forward-looking
expert and an innite state space, there are equilibria in which the truth is revealed in nite time.
We initially expected to prove the opposite result. Technically, the construction involves several
innovative ideas that we expect to be useful in analyzing many dynamic games with persistent
asymmetric information.
Discussion
The true state is revealed at either time 2 or time T    ; where T    can be chosen to be at
most 5 (specied at start of Appendix D.2.1): Thus, the decision-maker chooses his best possible
action, equal to the true state, in all but the rst few periods. It is tempting to conclude that a
long horizon means an equilibrium approaching the rst-best, but unfortunately this is not true
when the decision-maker and expert are equally patient. As explained after equation (4) ; a long
horizon also makes it di¢ cult to incentivize the expert, requiring a proportionally larger distortion
in the initial recommendation functions, and thereby imposing a proportionally larger cost to the
decision-maker (from having to follow such bad early advice in order to learn the truth). We do,
however, show in the next subsection that if the decision-maker is more patient than the expert,
our fully revealing equilibrium has more attractive welfare properties, and works for a much larger
set of decision-maker preferences and beliefs: If the expert does not care much about the future,
it becomes easy to incentivize him to join the right separable group, which, in turn, implies little
need to distort the initial recommendations, and therefore little cost to the decision-maker from
following bad advice in the rst couple of periods. The benet to following this advice knowing
the exact optimal action in all but the rst few periods will then outweigh this cost for a patient
decision-maker. (Section 1 illustrated this in the extreme case E = 0; where the decision-maker
learned the exact truth with no distortion in the experts initial advice).
Remark 1 If we look at situations where the decision-maker cares only about the ultimate decision,
it is easy to see that our construction works for any prior (for all b < 116 , the bound from the proof of
Proposition D2 required for the expert), and yields the best possible outcome for the decision-maker.
Remark 2 If the decision-maker is not Bayesian, and his posterior beliefs (following any history)
simply assign equal probability to each type in his information set, then our construction yields fully
revealing equilibrium for any prior on [0; 1] if b  161 :13
13Our proof shows (not explicitly stated in this verison of the paper) that the DMs incentive compatibility
constraints are satised if his posterior beliefs, after each expert recommendation, assign su¢ ciently high probability
to each type in his information set. (We then show that for a Bayesian DM, there is an open set of priors generating
such posteriors).
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4.1 Information Revelation in Continuous Time
The equilibrium we constructed to prove Theorem 1 can be easily modied to yield a fully revealing
equilibrium in a continuous-time setting with arbitrary discount rates, so long as the decision-maker
is at least as patient as the expert.14 In particular, suppose that actions and recommendations may
be made at any time up until the end of the game; and that the decision-maker and the expert
discount the future at rates rDM ; rE ; respectively. We then obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose that preferences are given by (1) : For any bias b  161 and prior F for
which Theorem 1 holds, any horizon bT ; any expert discount rate rE > 0; and any decision-maker
discount rate rDM  rE ; a fully revealing equilibrium exists.
Proof:
Leave all action functions and specications from the proof of Theorem 1 unchanged, except
for the timeline shown in Figure 1: now, let Group I pairs recommend v1 up to time t1(0); then
v2 up to time t4; and then reveal the truth, and let Group II; III pairs now recommend u1 up to
time t2(a); u2 up to time t3; then reveal the truth, where
t1(0) =
ln
 
1  20rE

 rE ; t2(a) =
ln
 
1  2arE

 rE ; t3 =
ln
 
1  2rE
 rE ; t4 =
ln
 
1  (T   )rE
 rE
(6)
with  = 1 e
 rE bT
TrE
( bT is the (freely specied) horizon in the statement of the Proposition, and the
T is the horizon used in our original construction, see appendix Section D.2.1).
By construction, this simply multiplies the experts payo¤s from our original construction by a
constant, : The disutility to expert type  from following the strategy of a Group II or III pair
say, recommending u1(0) up to time t2(a); u2(0) up to time t3; and 0 up to time bT isZ t2(a)
0
e r
Et
 
u1(
0)     b2 dt+ Z t3
t2(a)
e r
Et
 
u2(
0)     b2 dt+ Z bT
t3
e r
Et
 
0      b2 dt
= 
h
2a
 
u1(
0)     b2 + 2(1  a)  u2(0)     b2 + (T   2)  0      b2i
(the second line simply evaluates the integrals using (6) : for example,
R t1(0)
0 e
 rEtdt = 1 e
 rEt1(0)
rE
=
20): This is precisely  times the payo¤, from our original construction, to an expert of type
 2 [0; 1] from following the strategy prescribed for type 0 2 [0; 1] (see (25) and (29) in appendix,
14We switch here to continuous time for convenience. The proof of Theorem 1 is also essentially written for
continuous time in our initial equilibrium construction, the times at which the DM is instruced to change his action
are not necessarily integers but we show at the end of the proof how to modify the construction for a discrete-time
setting, via public randomization and/or scaling up the horizon. Something similar could of course be done here,
but as our construction requires fairly exact ratios on the (discounted values of the) durations of each action, this is
much more convenient in continuous time.
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Section D.1.4). Similarly, the disutility to expert type  from following the strategy of a Group
I pair  say, recommending v1(0) up to time t1(0); v2(0) up to time t4, and 0 up to time bT
is exactly  times the payo¤, from our original construction, to a perfectly patient expert who
recommends v1(0) up to time 20; v2(0) up to time T      20; and the truth up to time T:
So, since the experts payo¤s are exactly the same as before, for each possible true type  and
each possible type 0 he could choose to mimic, it follows that if the expert nds it optimal to tell
the truth in our original construction (with discrete time and discount factor E = 1); then an
expert with continuous-time discount rate rE will likewise nd it optimal to tell the truth, given
our modied timeline.
For the DM: if rDM = rE ; then we likewise obtain that in continuous time, with discount rate
rDM and our modied timeline, all payo¤s are identical to those in our construction used to prove
(1) : If rDM < rE ; so that the DM is more patient than the expert, then things only become easier.
As discussed in the appendix (Observation D4 of Section D.2), we need only show that the DM
cannot gain by deviating at time t = 20 (which is now time t = t1(0) with our modied timeline)
if he receives a recommendation v2(I) from a Group I pair fI ; h(I)g; or at time t = 0 (when he
may get either a recommendation u1(II) = v1(I) which could have been sent by any of the 4 types
in fI ; h(I); II ; g(II)g; or a recommendation u1(III), which could only come from a Group III
pair fIII ; g(III)g: Let us rst consider deviations at time t = t1(0) : in our modied timeline, if
he assigns probabilities p; 1 p to the types I ; h(I) in his information set, then he expects to earn
ow disutility

p
 
v2(
I)  I2 + (1  p)  v2(I)  h(I)2 from time t1(0) to time t4; at which
point the expert should reveal the truth (so disutility drops to zero for the rest of the game). If
he instead deviates to the best myopically optimal action, x  pI + (1  p)h(I); then from time
t1(0) to bT he will earn expected ow disutility
p
 
x   I2 + (1  p)  x   h(I)2 = p(1  p)  h(I)  I2
We need the equilibrium disutility to be smaller than the disutility from deviating, which rearranges
to the following condition:0@R t4t1(0) e rDM tdtR bT
t1(0)
e rDM tdt
1A p  v2(I)  I2 + (1  p)  v2(I)  h(I)2
p(1  p)  h(I)  I2
!
 1 (7)
Similarly, at a time t = 0 information set of the form fIII ; g(III)g; the gain from deviating is
smaller than the cost whenever the following expression is  1 :
R t2(a)
0 e
 rDMtdtR bT
0 e
 rDMtdt

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
E[ow disutility from action u2 j 2f;g()g
E[ow disutility from best deviation

(8)
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And at a time t = 0 information set containing both a Group I pair and a Group II pair,
fI ; h(I); II ; g(II)g; letting p1; p2; p3; p4 denote the respective probabilities on the four types,
an upper bound on the ratio of equilibrium disutility, to disutility from the best possible deviation,
is15
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We have an equilibrium if (7) holds for every Group I pair fI ; h(I)g; the expression in (8) is weakly
below 1 for every Group III pair fIII ; g(III)g; and the expression in (9) is weakly below 1 for
every information set of the form fI ; h(I); II ; g(II)g: At rDM = rE ; these reduce to precisely
the inequalities proven to hold in Section D4. (For example, consider (7) : at rDM = rE ; using
(6) ; the rst time ratioterm reduces to T  20T 20 : And since we have not made any modications
to the action functions or information sets, the constraint then simply says that the length of the
v2-recommendation phase in our original construction (T      20); times the ow disutility from
choosing v2; must be smaller than the length of the remaining game (T   20); times the ow
disutility from choosing the myopically optimal action).
We complete the proof in the Appendix (Section E), showing that the constraints in (9) ; (8) ;
and (7) become more relaxed as rDM decreases.
As rDM approaches zero and the horizon increases, we can push the result further, obtaining
an equilibrium with attractive welfare properties for a large range of biases and priors:
Theorem 2 If rE is bounded above zero and preferences are given by (1) with b < 116 , then, for any
prior F with a density that is everywhere bounded away from zero and innity, there is a horizon T 
and discount rate r such that a fully revealing equilibrium exists whenever rDM < r and bT > T :
In this equilibrium, the decision-makers average disutility goes to zero as bT !1 and rDM ! 0:
15 In the disutility ratio terms, the denominator supposes that whenever  2 fI ; h(I)g; the DM chooses
the myopically optimal action conditional on his information set; and that when  2 fII ; g(II)g; he chooses the
corresponding myopically optimal action. In fact, at time 0, he knows only that  2 fI ; h(I); II ; g(II)g; so he
will typically do worse than if he knew the true pair: therefore, our expression gives an upper bound on the ratio
of equilibrium to deviation disutilty. Section D.2 (see outline, specically the paragraph referring to Proposition
D6) proves that this upper bound is less than 1 (for a perfectly patient DM and our original timeline, at all such
information sets), which is su¢ cient to establish that the DM cannot gain by deviating.
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Proof: Again use the timeline (6) ; together with all action and strategy specications of our
original construction; as above in Proposition 4, this leaves all utility expressions and analysis for
the expert unchanged from our original construction; and as noted in the appendix, Proposition D2,
our equilibrium works for the expert for all b < 116 : For the decision-maker, we just need to check
the incentive constraints in (9) ; (8) ; and (7). We can conclude, from the fact that they held in our
original construction, that the equilibrium ow disutilities (numerators in the second term of each
expression) must be bounded. Our original construction also species partner functions which
have positive and nite derivatives, which implies (see (5)) that for any prior which has a positive
bounded density, the decision-makers posteriors over all information sets assign a strictly positive
probability to each type; this implies that the myopically optimal action at each information set
is bounded away from the true state, and therefore the ow disutility to the decision-maker if he
deviates to the myopically optimal action is bounded away from zero. We conclude that the second
ow disutilityratios in (9) ; (8) ; and (7) are all nite. However, the rst time ratioterms in
these expressions go to zero as rDM ! 0 and bT !1; noting that (6) and rE bounded above zero
imply that t1(0); t2(a); t3; t4 are all nite. Therefore, the ratio of the DMs equilibrium disutility,
compared to his disutility from the best deviation, goes to zero as rDM ! 0 and bT !1, implying
that we have an equilibrium. Moreover, since the DMs equilibrium ow disutility is bounded up to
time t4 and zero thereafter; with t4 nite, it follows that as rDM ! 0; the DMs average expected
payo¤ goes to zero, thus completing the proof.
Remark 3 Compared to Theorem 1, this result guarantees a fully revealing equilibrium for nearly
all priors over the state space, and for a much larger set of biases (b < 116 ; rather than b <
1
61):
Note also that the argument does not rely on quadratic preferences for the decision-maker.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that dynamic strategic communication di¤ers from its static counterpart. Our
most striking result is that fully revealing equilibria exist. The equilibria are admittedly complex,
and we do not suggest that they resemble any communication schemes currently in practice. This
was not our goal; rather, we wished to determine whether it is possible for a decision-maker to
design a questions-and-incentives scheme to elicit the precise truth out of a biased expert, such
that the expert would be willing to commit to and follow the proposed scheme. Our construction
proves that it is indeed possible, explains exactly how to do so when the expert has quadratic-loss
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preferences16 and the true state is constant,17 and highlights the conditions under which he would
indeed desire to do so. In particular, we have shown that the proposed communication scheme
can be of great benet to the decision-maker if he is either more patient than the expert, or if he
can hire the expert on a short-term basis. (This may provide one additional rationale for hiring
consultants rather than permanent advisors).
The main novel ingredient of our model is that there are multiple rounds of communication,
with a new action chosen after each round. The dynamic incentive considerations for the expert
allow us to group together types that are far apart, forming separable groups, which is the key to
obtaining greater information revelation. Our dynamic setup also allows for future communication
to be conditioned on past actions (trigger strategies), and we show how information revelation can
be facilitated through this channel.
The forces that we identify may be present in many dynamic environments with asymmetric
information. Think, for example, of a dynamic contracting environment with limited commitment,
or more generally, of a dynamic mechanism problem. In these models as well, past behavior sets the
stage for future behavior. And, in contrast to the vast majority of the recent literature on dynamic
mechanism design,18 one needs to worry about both global and local incentive constraints, even
with simple stage payo¤s that satisfy the single-crossing property.
Lastly, given the important insights from cheap talk literature which have been widely applied
in both economics and political science, we hope and expect that the novel aspects of strategic
communication emphasized in our analysis will help shed light on many interesting dynamic prob-
lems.
16 It would be interesting to understand more generally the types of expert preferences for which this is possible,
but this is beyond the scope of the current paper. The general question is di¢ cult to analyze, given the large class of
possible equilibrium structures: in principle, one might need large nite separable groups in the rst stage (instead of
our groups of two), gradually subdividing via long action sequences (instead of our sequences of two initial actions).
17One could presumably apply our construction in a model where the state evolves slowly over time, for example
by restricting how frequently the expert can observe state changes, and playing our equilibrium within each block
between state observations. If the probability of a state change between observations is small, this would lead to an
equilibrium where the decision-maker knows the true state most of the time.
18 In recent years, motivated by the large number of important applications, there has been substantial work on
dynamic mechanism design. See, for example, the survey of Bergemann and Said (2011) and the references therein,
or Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2011).
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
When we restrict attention to monotonic partition equilibria, there will be some point in the game
at which the last subdivision of an interval occurs, say period bT  T: Assume (without loss of
generality) that one interval is partitioned into two, inducing actions y1 and y2; and let b be the
expert type who is indi¤erent between y1; y2: Since no subdivision occurs after period bT ; it follows
that type bs indi¤erence condition in period bT is
1 +  + ::+ T bT 1uE y1; ^; b  1 +  + ::+ T bT 1uE y2; ^; b ;
which reduces to the static indi¤erence condition. But then, if this subdivision is possible, it cannot
be the case that all static equilibria are equivalent babbling. This follows by Corollary 1 of Crawford
and Sobel (1982).
Observe that all the arguments in this proof go through even if we allow for trigger strategies.
This is because at the point where the last subdivision occurs, it is impossible to incentivize the
decision-maker to choose anything other than his myopic best response: he knows that no further
information will be revealed, and so he knows that he cannot be rewarded in the future for choosing
a suboptimal action now. So, the above argument applies.
B Monotonic partition equilibria with more partitions
Suppose that E = DM = 1; types are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and preferences satisfy
(1), with bias b = 112 : Using the standard arguments, one can establish that game has only two
equilibria:19 a babbling equilibrium, and an equilibrium with two partitions,

0; 13
[13 ; 1 ; inducing
actions 16 and
4
6 : Now we show that when T = 2, there exists a monotonic partition equilibrium
where the state space is ultimately divided into three sub-intervals.
We look for an equilibrium with the following signaling rule:
types in [0; 1] send message sequence A = (m1(1);m2(1));
types in [1; 2] send message sequence B = (m1(2);m2(2));
types in [2; 1] send message sequence C = (m1(2);m2(3)):
With this signaling rule, in the rst period the interval [0; 1] is partitioned into [0; 1] and [1; 1].
The indi¤erence condition for type 2 in period 2 yields
1 + 2
2
  2   b
2
=

1 + 2
2
  2   b
2
) 2 = 1
3
+
1
2
1 (12)
The second-period actions induced are y2(1) =
1
2 ; y2(2) =
3
41 +
1
6 and y2(3) =
1
41 +
2
3 ; and the
rst-period actions are y1(1) =
1
2 and y1(2) =
1+1
2 :
19The largest number of subintervals that the type space can be divided into is the largest integer that satises
 2bp2 + 2bp+ 1 > 0; (10)
whose solution is *
 1
2
+
1
2
r
1 +
2
b
+
; (11)
and where hxi denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x:
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After any out-of-equilibrium message the decision-maker assigns probability one to the state
belonging in [0; 1] inducing yout = 12 : With these out-of equilibrium beliefs it is immediate to see
that no type has an incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium message.
At equilibrium, 1 must satisfy the following indi¤erence condition:0BB@1 + 12| {z }
y1(2)
  1   1
12
1CCA
2
+
0BB@341 + 16| {z }
y2(2)
  1   1
12
1CCA
2
= 2
0BB@ 12|{z}
y1(1)=y2(1)
  1   1
12
1CCA
2
which is solved by 1 = 0:2482; together with (12) ; we then obtain three nal partitions, with cuto¤s
1 = 0:2482; 2 = 0:457 43; with this, the actions become y1(1) = y2(1) = 0:124 1; y1(2) = 0:624 1;
y2(2) = 0:352 8; and y2(3) = 0:728 7:
In constructing this strategy prole, we imposed only local incentive compatibility constraints,
requiring that type 1 is indi¤erent in period 1 between inducing action sequence
 
y1(1); y2(1)

and 
y1(2); y2(2)

; and that type 2 is indi¤erent in period 2 between inducing actions y2(2) and y2(3):
Now we want to verify that these conditions are su¢ cient for global incentive compatibility. At
t = 2 the game is isomorphic to the static one, where the fact that 2 is indi¤erent between y2(2)
and y2(3) implies that all types above 2 prefer y2(3) and all types below 2 prefer y2(2): To verify
that types below 1 prefer message sequence A and types above 1 prefer message sequence B; we
plot the di¤erence U(A; )   U(B; ) and show that it is positive for all  < 1 and negative for
 > 1 :
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
theta
U(A)-U(B)
In our dynamic equilibrium, the experts (ex ante) payo¤ is  0:0659 and the decision-makers
(ex ante) payo¤ is  0:052: If the most informative static equilibrium is played in both periods,
payo¤s are  0:069 to the expert,  0:055 to the decision-maker, both strictly worse than in our
dynamic monotonic partition equilibrium.
C Pareto comparisons of dynamic cheap talk equilibria
The following example demonstrate that equilibria with more partitions can be Pareto inferior to
the equilibria with fewer partitions
Take E = DM = 1 and b = 0:08; and consider the most informative static partition equilibrium
where the number of partitions is p = 3: At this equilibrium the state space is divided into [0; 0:013];
[0:013; 0:347] and [0:347; 1]. The corresponding optimal actions of the decision-maker are given by
y1 = 0:0067 y2 = 0:18 y3 = 0:673;
from which we can calculate the ex-ante expected utility levels for the expert  0:032 and for the
decision-maker  0:0263. Then, at the equilibrium of the dynamic game where the most informative
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static equilibrium is played at t = 1 and babbling thereafter, the total expected utility is  0:065
for the expert, and  0:053 for the decision-maker.
We now construct a dynamic equilibrium where the type space is subdivided into more subin-
tervals, but both playersex-ante expected payo¤s are lower. We look for an equilibrium with the
following signaling rule:
types in [0; 1] send message sequence (m1(1);m2(1))
types in [1; 2] send message sequence (m1(2);m2(2))
types in [2; 3] send message sequence (m1(2);m2(3))
types in [3; 1] send message sequence (m1(3);m2(4)):
So types are partitioned into four intervals in stage 2, but in stage 1, the types in [1; 2] and
[2; 3] pool together to send the same message m1(2): Since the signaling rule does not depend
on the decision-makers action at stage 1, the decision-maker will choose the following myopically
optimal actions:
y1(1) = y2(1) =
1
2
;
y1(2) =
1 + 3
2
; y2(2) =
1 + 2
2
; y2(3) =
2 + 3
2
;
y1(3) = y2(4) =
1 + 3
2
:
After any out-of-equilibrium message the decision-maker assigns probability one to the state
belonging in [0; 1] inducing yout = 12 : With these out-of-equilibrium beliefs it is immediate to see
that no type has an incentive to deviate.
In equilibrium, type 1 is indi¤erent between action sequences fy1(1); y2(1)g and fy1(2); y2(2)g;
type 2 is indi¤erent between 2nd-period actions y2(2) and y2(3); and type 3 is indi¤erent between
action sequences fy1(2); y2(3)g and fy1(3); y2(4)g: Therefore, equilibrium cuto¤s are the solution to
the following system of equations:20
2

1
2
  1   b
2
 

1 + 3
2
  b  1
2
 

1 + 2
2
  b  1
2
= 0;
1 + 2
2
  b  2
2
 

2 + 3
2
  b  2
2
= 0;
2

1 + 3
2
  b  3
2
 

1 + 3
2
  b  3
2
 

2 + 3
2
  b  3
2
= 0:
At b = 0:08; the only solution that gives numbers in [0; 1] is 1 = 0:0056; 2 = 0:015; 3 = 0:345 ;
and the actions induced for t = 1 and for t = 2 are respectively given by y1(1) = y2(1) = 0:00278;
y1(2) = 0:175; y2(2) = 0:0105, y2(3) = 0:18 and y1(3) = y2(4) = 0:673: This implies the following
total ex-ante expected utility for the expert  0:066; which is lower than 2( 0:033) =  0:0656: The
utility for the decision-maker is  0:053 which is lower than 2( 0:026) = 0:052:
This example illustrates that although the interval is divided into more subintervals here, both
players strictly worse o¤ compared to the one where the most informative static equilibrium is
played in the rst period and babbling thereafter. The feature that less partitions lead to higher
ex-ante welfare for both players also appears in example 1 of Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007).
20 It is trivial to check exactly as we did in previous examples that these indi¤erence conditions su¢ ce for global
incentive compatibility.
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D Proof of Theorem 1
We will prove by construction that a fully revealing equilibrium exists. We rst choose the endpoints
1; 2; 3 described in the proof outline: for any bias b < 161 ; dene a < 0 by
(a   2 + 2e a )e2   a = 1
b
(13)
and then set
3 =
1
b
+ a ; 2 = 3   2; 1 = 2   3e 2 (14)
It will be convenient to describe types parametrically, via functions x : [ 2; 0] ! [0; 1]; g :
[ 2; 0]! [2; 3]; z : [a ; 0]! [1; 2]; and h : [a ; 0]! [3; 1b ]: Then, let u1(a; a); u2(a; a) denote
the rst, second recommendations of types x(a); g(a) (for all a 2 [ 2; 0]), and let v1(a; 0); v2(a; 0)
denote the rst, second recommendations of types (z(a); h(a)) (for all a 2 [a ; 0]): With this nota-
tion, Groups I,II, III described in the text are as follows:
Group I = fz(a); h(a) j a 2 [a ; 0]g
Group II = fx(a); g(a) j a 2 [ 2; 0]; and 9 a0 2 [a ; 0] with v1(a0; 0) = u1(a; a)g
Group III = fx(a); g(a)j a 2 [ 2; 0]; and x(a); g(a) =2 Group IIg
In our proposed equilibrium construction, each Group I pair fz(a); h(a)g recommends v1(a; 0) for
20 periods, then v2(a; 0) for T   20 periods, then reveals the truth at time T   ; each Group
II pair fx(a); g(a)g recommends u1(a; a) for 2a periods, then u2(a; a) for 2(1   a) periods,
then separates and reveals the truth for the nal T  2 periods; and moreover, the recommendation
u1(a; a) coincides with the recommendation v1(a0; 0) of some Group I pair fz(a0); h(a0)g: Group
III is identical to Group II, except that their recommendations do not coincide with those of any
Group I pair.
We also specify the following o¤-path strategy for the expert: if the decision-maker ever devi-
ates, by rejecting a recommendation that the expert made, then (i) if the expert himself has not
previously deviated: send no further recommendations (equivalently, repeat the current recommen-
dation in all subsequent periods). And (ii) if the expert has observably deviated in the past, behave
as if the deviation did not occur. (For example, if he sends the initial recommendation u1(0; 0)
prescribed for types fx(0); g(0)g; but then follows this with anything other than recommendation
u2(0; 0) at time 20; subsequently behave as if the deviation never occurred and he indeed sent
u2(0; 0) at time 20):
D.1 Optimality for the Expert
We prove that the expert wishes to follow the prescribed recommendation strategy via three propo-
sitions. Proposition D1 species strategies and beliefs for the decision-maker such that the expert
has no incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium recommendation sequence, so we need only make
sure that he does not wish to mimic any other type. Proposition D2 shows that in the prescribed
revelation phase, the expert indeed nds it optimal to reveal the truth, provided that there have
been no previous deviations. It remains only to show that the expert has no incentive to deviate
prior to the prescribed revelation phase - by mimicking the initial recommendations of some other
type - which we show in Proposition D3.
We specify the following strategy and beliefs for the decision-maker:
If there are no detectable deviations by the expert (i.e., he sends the equilibrium recommenda-
tion sequence for some type  2 [0; 1b ]), then follow all recommendations, using Bayesrule to assign
beliefs at each information set. Following deviations: (i) If the expert observably deviates at time 0
(sending an o¤-path initial recommendation), subsequently adopt the strategy/beliefs that would
follow if the expert had instead sent the recommendation u1(0; 0) prescribed for types fx(0); g(0)g;
(ii) If the expert observably deviates on his 2nd recommendation (i.e., if an initial recommendation
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u1(a; a) (or v1(a; 0)) is followed by something other than u2(a; a) (or v2(a; 0)); ignore it as
an error, and subsequently adopt the strategy/beliefs that would follow had the deviation not oc-
curred; (iii) If the expert deviates observably in the revelation phase, ignore it as an error, assigning
probability 1 to the lowest type in the current information set, and accordingly choosing this as the
myopically optimal action; (iv) And nally, if the decision-maker himself deviates, rejecting some
recommendation by the expert, then he subsequently maintains the current (at time of deviation)
beliefs, anticipating that the expert will subsequently repeat the current (at time of deviation)
recommendation, and ignoring any other recommendations as errors.
D.1.1 Expert Optimality: O¤-Path Behavior
Proposition D1: Under the above strategy and beliefs prescribed for the decision-maker, the
expert has no incentive to choose an o¤-path recommendation sequence.
Proof of Proposition D1: Follows trivially from the specied strategy and beliefs for the decision-
maker: (i) a deviation at time zero is equivalent to mimicking type x(0) (who recommends u1(0; 0)
at time t = 0); (ii) a deviation on the 2nd recommendation has no e¤ect, since the decision-maker
ignores it; (iii) a deviation in the revelation phase, if there have been no previous deviations,
is equivalent to mimicking the strategy of the lowest type in the decision-makers current (pre-
revelation) information set; and (iv) if the decision-maker has previously deviated, then (by point
(iv) of the above strategy-belief specication) he will chose whichever action was myopically optimal
at the time of deviation, regardless of the experts message; therefore, babbling is optimal for the
expert, since his message has no e¤ect on the decision-makers action.
D.1.2 Expert Optimality: Truth Revelation Phase
Proposition D2: In the prescribed revelation phase, (i) if there have been no previous deviations
by the decision-maker, then the expert nds it optimal to reveal the truth; (ii) if the decision-maker
has ever deviated, then the expert nds it optimal to babble (e.g. by remaining silent).
Proof of Proposition D2: Part (ii) follows immediately from Proposition D1 (iv). For part (i):
our specication of the expert strategy is such that at time 20; the decision-makers information
set contains at most two types: either a pair fx(a); g(a)g (in which case the truth should be revealed
at time 2; and the DM plans to choose g(a) if the expert recommends g(a); x(a) otherwise), or a
pair fz(a); h(a)g (in which case the truth should be revealed at time T    ; and the DM plans to
choose h(a) if the expert recommends it, z(a) otherwise). So, it su¢ ces to show that each type
would rather tell the truth than mimic his partner: in our rescaled type space, this requires simply
that all paired types be at least 2 units apart (so that (      1)2  (p()     1)2 for any pair
f; p()g): By (15) we have
min
a2[ 2;0]
jg(a)  x(a)j = 2   1
min
a2[a ;0]
jh(a)  z(a)j = 3   2
And by (14), 3   2 = 2; and 2   1 = (a   2 + 2e a ); which is greater than 2 whenever
a <  :8951 , b < 115:67 (using (13)). This is in fact all that is needed for the construction
to work for the expert, but we specify b < 161 in (13) to make the construction work for the
decision-maker.
D.1.3 Expert Optimality: Initial Recommendations
Propositions D1,D2 imply that once the expert has sent the initial recommendation (u1 or v1)
prescribed for some type ; it is optimal to follow also the continuation recommendations prescribed
for that type. So, the only time when it could possibly be protable to deviate is at time t = 0 :
we need to make sure that each type  prefers to send the proposed equilibrium sequence of
30
recommendations, rather than the sequence prescribed for any other type 0:21 We now choose
parametrizations of functions x; g; z; h; along with action function u1; u2; v1; v2, which guarantee
that the expert indeed nds it optimal to send the prescribed initial recommendation:
Proposition D3: Let the action functions and type parametrizations be as follows:
x(a) = 3 + a  3ea; g(a) = 3 + a; z(a) = 1
b
+ a  2ea a ; h(a) = 1
b
+ a (15)
u1(a; a) = 3 +K   T   2
2
a 
r
1  a
a
p
T   2
s
Cu + a

K   T
4
a

(16)
u2(a; a) = 3 +K   T   2
2
a+
r
a
1  a
p
T   2
s
Cu + a

K   T
4
a

(17)
v1(a; 0) = 3 +
2K (a a)
T   
r
(T  20)
0
q
(T )(T 2)

Cu+(T  2 )K2+2K(a a) T2 (a a)2
T  (18)
v2(a; 0) = 3 +
2K (a a)
T  +
q
40
T  20
q
(T )(T 2)

Cu+(T  2 )K2+2K(a a) T2 (a a)2
T  (19)
for constants Cu;K; and for now taking T; 0; a as given (T is the horizon, and a; 0 relate to
the duration of recommendations u1; v1 as described in the strategies above). Also set  (length of
the revelation phase for types in Group I) according to

T   2 =  
(2   1)(2   1   2)
(1b   1)(1b   1   2)
(20)
Then, for all types ; 0 2 [0; 1b ]; expert type  prefers his equilibrium recommendation sequence to
that sent by type 0; and in particular has no incentive to deviate at time t = 0.
Proof of Proposition D3:
Let Du(0j) denote the disutility to type  from following the recommendation sequence pre-
scribed for a type 0 2 [0; 1][ [2; 3]; and let Dv(0j) denote the disutility to type  from following
the strategy prescribed for a type 0 2 [1; 2][ [3; 1b ]: The proof proceeds through two main Lem-
mas. Lemma D3.1 proves that the expert strategy is locally incentive compatible: for each interval
[i; i+1]; i 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g; no expert type  2 [i; i+1] wishes to mimic any other type 0 2 [i; i+1]
from the same interval. Lemma D3.2 proves that the expert strategy is also globally incentive
compatible: no expert type wishes to mimic any type 0 from any other interval. The proofs will
use calculations obtained below in Lemmas D3.3 and D3.4.
Lemma D3.1 (Local IC): For each interval [i; i+1]; with i = 0; 1; 2; 3; and any pair of types
; 0 2 [i; i+1]; the disutility to type  from mimicking type 0 is (weakly) increasing in
0    ;
thus minimized when
0    = 0: Therefore, for each  2 [i; i+1]; truth-telling is (weakly) better
than mimicking any other type in the interval.
Proof of Lemma D3.1:
Di¤erentiating disutility expressions (25), (26) ; (27) ; and (28) (obtained below in Lemma D3.3)
21This is what the text refers to as "providing incentives to join the right separable group. We need to make
sure, for example, that type  = 0 prefers to induce the action sequence (u1(0; 0); u2(0; 0); 0); rather than e.g. the
sequence that type 0 6= 0 is supposed to send; by Propositions D1,D2, the choice to follow a di¤erent recommendation
sequence can only be made at time t = 0:
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gives
dDu(x(a)j)
dx(a)
=
dDu(g(a)j)
dx(a)
+
2(T   2) (x(a)     1)x0(a)  2(T   2) (g(a)     1) g0(a)
x0(a)
= 0 + 2(T   2)

3 + a  3ea      1  3 + a     1
1  3ea

(by (15) )
= 2(T   2)

3e
a
3ea   1

(x(a)  ) (21)
dDv(z(a)j)
dz(a)
=
dDv(h(a)j)=da
z0(a)
+
2 (z(a)     1) z0(a)  2 (h(a)     1)h0(a)
z0(a)
= 2

2ea a
2ea a   1

(z(a)  ) (22)
dDu(g(a)j)
dg(a)
= 0 (23)
dDv(h(a)j)
dh(a)
= 0 (24)
Consider rst a type  2 [0; 1]: By (21) ; noting that 3ea3ea 1 > 0 (since 3ea  3e 2 = 2 1 
8; by Proposition D2), we see that dDu(x(a)j)dx(a) has the same sign as (x(a)  ) : So if x(a)   > 0;
then Du(x(a)j) is increasing in x(a); thus increasing in (x(a)  ) ; while if x(a)    < 0; then
Du(x(a)j) is increasing in ( x(a)), thus increasing in    x(a): Combined, these establish that
Du(x(a)j) is strictly increasing in jx(a)  j ; as desired.
Next consider a type  2 [1; 2]: By (22) ; noting that

2ea a
2ea a 1

> 0 (since a 2 [a ; 0] implies
2ea a  2); we see that dDv(z(a)j)dz(a) has the same sign as z(a)   ; and is thus positive (disutility
increasing in z(a)   ) if z(a) > ; and negative (disutility increasing in    z(a)) if z(a) < :
Combined, these establish that Du(z(a)j) is strictly increasing in jz(a)  j ; as desired.
By (23) and (24) ; the disutility to type  from mimicking a type g(a) 2 [2; 3] or h(a) 2 [3; 1b ]
is independent of the particular type g(a); h(a) chosen. Thus, Du(g(a)j) is weakly increasing (in
fact constant) in jg(a)  j ; andDu(h(a)j) is weakly increasing (constant) in jh(a)  j, completing
the proof.
Lemma D3.2: For every interval [i; i+1] (i = 0; 1; 2; 3); and every  2 [i; i+1]; following the
prescribed (truthful) recommendation sequence is better than mimicking any type 0 drawn from
any other interval [j ; j+1] with j 6= i:
Proof of Lemma D3.2:
Consider rst a type  2 [0; 1]: By Lemma D3.1, truth-telling is better than mimicking any
other type 0 2 [0; 1]; in particular type 1 = x( 2): By Lemma D3.4 (i) (below), type  2 [0; 1]
prefers type x( 2)s sequence to type z(0)s sequence; and by Lemma D3.1, it is better to mimic
type z(0) = 1; than any other type z(a) 2 (1; 2] (since z(a) >  implies that Dv(z(a)j) is
increasing in z(a)  ); together, these establish that mimicking a type 0 2 [1; 2] is not optimal.
By Lemma D3.4 (ii), type   2 prefers z(a)s sequence (right endpoint of [1; 2]) to g( 2)s
sequence (left endpoint of [2; 3]); and by Lemma D3.1, disutility to type  from mimicking type
g(a) 2 [2; 3] is independent of a; together, this implies that type  also does not want to mimic any
type g(a) 2 [2; 3]: And nally, by Lemma D3.4 (iii), type   2 prefers the sequence prescribed
for type g(0) (right endpoint of [2; 3]) to that prescribed for type h(a) (left endpoint of [3; 1b ]),
which (by Lemma D3.1) yields the same utility as mimicking any other type h(a) 2 [3; 1b ]; thus it
is not optimal to mimic any type h(a) 2 [3; 1b ]: This establishes that type  2 [0; 1] does not wish
to mimic any type 0 from any other interval.
Next consider type  2 [1; 2]: By Lemma D3.1, truth-telling is better than mimicking any
other type z(a) 2 [1; 2]; in particular type z(0) = 1; by Lemma D3.4 (i), type   1 prefers
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the sequence prescribed for type z(0); to that prescribed for type x( 2); and by Lemma D3.1, it is
better to mimic x( 2) (right endpoint of [0; 1]) than any other type x(a) 2 [0; 1]; since Du(x(a)j)
is increasing in j   x(a)j and we have here  > x(a); together, this implies that type  does not
wish to mimic any type 0 2 [0; 1]: The proof that he doesnt wish to mimic any type g(a) 2 [2; 3]
or h(a) 2 [3; 1b ] is identical to the one given in the previous paragraph.
Now consider a type  2 [2; 3]: As explained in the previous two paragraphs, following the
truthful recommendation sequence yields the same utility as mimicking any other type g(a) 2
[2; 3] or h(a) 2 [3; 1b ]; so we just need to make sure that it is not optimal to mimic types
0 2 [0; 1][[1; 2]: By Lemma D3.4 (ii), type   2 prefers type g( 2)s sequence (left endpoint of
[2; 3]) to type z(a)s sequence (right endpoint of [1; 2]); by Lemma D3.1, such a type   2 also
prefers type z(a)s sequence to the one prescribed for any other (further-away) type z(a) 2 [1; 2];
combined, this establishes that mimicking a type z(a) 2 [1; 2] is not optimal. By Lemma D3.4
(i), it is better to mimic type z(0)s sequence than x( 2)s sequence, which in turn is better (by
Lemma D3.1) than any other type x(a)s sequence. Thus, it is not optimal to mimic any type
x(a) 2 [0; 1]; completing the proof for types  2 [2; 3]:
The argument that types  2 [3; 1b ] dont wish to mimic types from other intervals is identical
to the proof in the previous paragraph (for types  2 [2; 3]).
This completes the proof of Lemma D3.2.
D.1.4 Expert Optimality: Preliminary Calculations
Lemma D3.3: Given the type parametrizations and action functions given in Proposition D3,
disutility expressions Du
 
0j ; Dv(0j) are given by
Du(x(a)j) = Du(g(a)j) + (T   2) (x(a)     1)2   (T   2) (g(a)     1)2 (25)
Du(g(a)j) = T (3      1)2 + 4K (3      1) + 2K2 + 2(T   2)Cu (26)
Dv(z(a)j) = Dv(h(a)j)  2 (h(a)  z(a))

h(a) + z(a)
2
     1

(27)
Dv(h(a)j) = 2K2 + 2(T   2)Cu + 4 (3      1)K + T (   3 + 1)2 (28)
Proof of Lemma D3.3:
The disutility Du(g(a)j) to expert type  from following the strategy prescribed for type g(a) 2
[2; 3], using (16) ; (17) ; is
2a (u1(a; a)     1)2 + 2(1  a) (u2(a; a)     1)2 + (T   2) (g(a)     1)2 (29)
= 2(1  a)
 
3 +K   T   2
2
a     1 +
r
a
1  a
p
T   2
s
Cu + a

K   T
4
a
!
+2a
 
3 +K   T   2
2
a     1 
r
1  a
a
p
T   2
s
Cu + a

K   T
4
a
!2
+(T   2) (x(a)     1)2
Expanding gives 22
Du(g(a)j) = 2

3      1 +K   T   2
2
a
2
+2(T 2)

Cu + a

K   T
4
a

+(T 2) (3 + a     1)2
If we now expand this expression, the coe¢ cients on a2; a reduce to zero (this is due to our choice
22Note that the coe¢ cients on the square roots were chosen to make this independent of a; as mentioned in
Appendix D3.1 (following (89)).
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g(a) = 3 + a); leaving
Du(g(a)j) = 2 (3      1 +K)2 + 2(T   2)Cu + (T   2) (3      1)2
which rearranges to expression (26) :
The disutility to type  from following the strategy prescribed for type x(a) 2 [0; 1]; Du(x(a)j);
is given by (29) ; just replacing g(a) with x(a) : this gives the desired expression (25) :
The disutility to type  from following the strategy prescribed for type h(a) 2 [3; 1b ] is
Dv(h(a)j) = 20 (v1(a; 0)     1)2 + (T      20) (v2(a; 0)     1)2 +  (h(a)     1)2
Again, the coe¢ cients on the square root terms in v1; v2 were chosen to make both disutility and
average action independent of 0 : substituting (18) ; (19) into the above expression and expanding,
we get
Dv(h(a)j) = (T   )

3 +
2K + a
T     

T    a     1
2
+  (h(a)     1)2
+2
 
(T   2)

Cu +
 
T  2


K2 + 2K (a  a)  T2 (a  a)2
T   
!
:
Substituting in h(a) = 1b + a; using 3 =
1
b + a ; and expanding, we nd (this is due to our choice
h0(a) = 1) that the coe¢ cients on both a2; a reduce to zero, so that our expression simplies further
to (28) : Finally, using the fact that the strategies for types h(a); z(a) di¤er only in the revelation
phase, so
Dv(h(a)j) Dv(z(a)j) =  (h(a)     1)2    (z(a)     1)2
we obtain (27) : This completes the proof.
Lemma D3.4: (utility at the endpoints)
Under the expressions given in Proposition D3, we have that (i) endpoint 1 = x( 2) = z(0) :
type  (weakly) prefers type x( 2)s recommendation sequence to z(0)s sequence i¤  2 [0; 1]; (ii)
endpoint 2 = z(a) = g( 2) : type  prefers z(a)s sequence to g( 2)s sequence i¤  2 [0; 2];
and (iii) endpoint 3 = g(0) = h(a) : all types are indi¤erent between the sequences sent by types
g(0); h(a):
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Proof of Lemma D3.4:
At 1 = x( 2) = z(0); we have (using the expressions in Lemma D3.3 and simplifying) that
Dv(z(0)j) Du(x( 2)j) equals
(T   2) (2   1) (1 + 2   2   2)  

1
b
  1

1
b
+ 1   2   2

Using (1b   1) = (T   2) (2 1)(2 1 2)( 1
b
 1 2) (by (20)); this simplies to
Dv(z(0)j) Du(x( 2)j) = 2(T   2) (2   1) (1
b
  2)
 
1   
1
b   1   2
!
(30)
This is negative, meaning that type  prefers z(0)s strategy to x( 2)s strategy, i¤  > 1; thus
23For example, consider part (i). In our construction, type 1 is both the right endpoint x( 2) of the interval
[0; 1]; and the left endpoint z(0) of the interval [1; 2] : part (i) says that type 1 is indi¤erent between the two
sequences prescribed for his type, and that everyone below 1 prefers the strategy of type x( 2); everyone above 1
prefers the strategy of type z(0):
34
establishing part (i).
At 2 = g( 2) = z(a); we have (by (27) and (26)
Du(g( 2)j) Dv(z(a)j) = (3   2) (3 + 2   2   2)
= 4 (2   ) (using 3   2 = 2) (31)
This is negative, meaning that type  prefers g( 2)s strategy to z(a)s strategy, i¤  > 2; proving
part (ii).
At 3; we have (by (26) and (28)),
Du(g(0)j) Dv(h(a)j) = 0 (32)
so that all types are indi¤erent between the strategies prescribed for type g(0) = 3; h(a) = 3;
as desired to complete the proof.
D.2 Optimality for the decision-maker
Let the expert strategy be as specied in the previous subsection, using the action functions and
parametrizations from Proposition D3, with  = (T   2) as in (20) : Recall that we had the
following free parameters: constants K;Cu; the horizon T , a number 0 2 [0; 1]; and numbers
a 2 [0; 1] 8a 2 [ 2; 0]: We wish to show that the specied strategies constitute a fully revealing
PBE: since we established expert optimality in the previous section, and since the beliefs and
o¤-path strategies specied for the decision-maker (see Proposition D1) trivially satisfy all PBE
requirements, all that remains is to prove that the decision-makers on-path strategy is optimal.
Recall the timeline presented in Figure 1 (Section 4). It is immediately clear that during the
revelation phase, when the experts recommendation is equal (with probability 1) to the true state,
the decision-maker indeed nds it optimal to follow the recommendation. In between time 20
(when Group I separates from Group II by switching to v2) and the revelation phase, no new
information is revealed, but any failure by the decision-maker to follow the experts recommenda-
tions will result in the expert subsequently babbling, rather than revealing the truth. So, the best
possible deviation is to choose the myopically optimal action in all subsequent periods, and the
strongest incentive to do so occurs at the earliest time that new information is revealed (when the
reward phase, revelation of the truth, is furthest away). So to prove decision-maker optimality,
we need only show that he does not want to deviate to the myopically optimal action either at time
t = 0; or at time t = 20 if he learns that he is in fact facing a Group I pair. We summarize this
as:
Observation D4: If the decision-maker cannot gain by deviating at time t 2 f0; 20g; then the
prescribed strategy is optimal.
D.2.1 Optimality for the decision-maker: Outline and Parameter Choices
Given T; 0 (and with  = (T   2) as specied by (20) ; we set the constants Cu;K according to
Cu =
1  0
0
K2
T   2 (33)
K =
0a

1 +
q
(T 20)(T )
20

(T      20) (34)
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And choose a horizon T 2 [Tmin; Tmax]; where24
Tmin =
8>>>><>>>>:
7 if  2 [0:4173; 0:50102)
5 2
1  if  2 [0:50102; 0:79202)
5: 474 8
2:7374 1:7374 if  2 [0:79202; 0:95203)
6 if   0:95203
; Tmax =
8>>>><>>>>:
7 if  2 [0:4173; 0:50102)
8 2
1  if  2 [0:50102; 0:79202)
4 2
1  if  2 [0:79202; 0:90913)
12: 005
6:0025 5:0025 if   0:90913
(35)
All proofs use 0 near 1 when a2 < 8; and 0 near 0 when a
2
 > 8: The parameter a
(relating to the time 2a at which Group II and III pairs fx(a); g(a)g switch from u1 to u2) may
depend on the specic pair fx(a); g(a)g; but is chosen in Lemma D7.1 to satisfy 0  a  1 8a: In
particular, we prove in Lemma D7.1 that our parameter choices guarantee that all action functions
are real-valued, and that every recommendation v1(a; 0) sent by a Group I pair, is also sent by
some Group II pair fx(a); g(a)g; for at least as long. The need for this overlap of u1; v1 is as follows:
the decision-makers gain to following the experts advice is large at information sets containing
only a Group II or III pair, but would be negative at time t = 0, for all priors, if his information
set contained only a Group I pair fz(a); h(a)g close to the endpoint pair fz(a); h(a)g = f2; 3g.25
So, for the equilibrium to work, we need to make sure that each Group I pairs initial message
coincides with that of a Group II pair, and then ensure (via the prior and construction details)
that the weight the decision-maker places on the Group II pair is high enough to make him want
to follow the recommendation. :
Proposition D6 shows that for a range of priors, the decision-makers gain to deviating at time
t = 0 (or later) is strictly negative at any information set containing only a group II or III pair
fx(a); g(a)g; so long as his posterior assigns a probability to type x(a) which lies within " of some
number pa 2 (0; 1) (a su¢ cient condition is that he assigns a probability between 0:3 and 0:7 to
each type). This then implies also that at time t = 0; if he gets a message v1(a; 0) which could
have been sent by either a Group II pair (in which case he wants to follow the advice) or a Group
I pair (in which case he might want to reject the advice), he will nd it optimal to follow the
recommendation as long as his posterior beliefs assign a high enough weight to the Group II pair,
so we conclude that there exist beliefs for which the decision-maker has no incentive to deviate at
time t = 0: It is also Proposition D6 that places an upper bound on the biases b for which the
equilibrium works.
Proposition D5 shows that if the expert sends a message v2(a; 0) at time t = 20; thus revealing
to the decision-maker that he is facing a Group I pair fz(a); h(a)g; then there exists an interval
of posteriors on each type for which the decision-maker will nd it optimal to choose the action
v2(a; 0):
Proposition D7 completes the proof, by proving that there exists an open set of probability
distributions over the state space which generate the posteriors needed in Propositions D5, D6.
Before proceeding with the proof, we briey comment on the timeline. First, note that Theorem
1 places only a lower bound on the horizon T ; whereas the constraint (35) in fact also places an
upper bound on the horizon: However, the construction may trivially be extended for larger horizons
in two ways: (i) add a babbling phase at the beginning; or (ii) scale everything up. All that matters
is the ratios the duration of each action phase relative to the horizonso e.g. the analysis for a
T -period equilibrium (where Groups II; III reveal the truth at time 2; Group I at time T   ) is
identical to the analysis for a T-period equilibrium (with Groups II; III revealing the truth at
time 2; Group I at time (T   ); for  any positive number):26 It should also be noted that,
while (35) can always be satised by an integer T; the times at which the DM is instructed to
24The previous version of the paper used the same bounds for  > 0:79202; but used the exact horizon T = 4 2
1 
on the range  2 [0:4173; 0:79202]: We have modied the horizon, to guarantee that (i) T may be chosen to be an
integer; and (ii) to expand the set of priors (from inniteto open) for which the construction works.
25 It may in fact be shown (see Section D.3.2) that this is necessarily true of any fully revealing construction:
the experts local + global IC constraints imply a su¢ ciently large distortion in some interval of types(and their
partners) recommendations that, if the DM were certain that he was facing one of these pairs, he would rather forego
learning the exact truth than follow their advice.
26This follows immediately from the derivations in Appendix D3.
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change his action namely, times 20; 2a; T    are not necessarily integers in our construction.
In a continuous-time setting, where action changes can be made frequently, this clearly poses no
problem. At the end of this proof (Section D.2.6), we explain how to handle integer constraints if
time is discrete.
D.2.2 Optimality for the decision-maker: Deviations at time t = 20
Proposition D5: Fix a   1:773; choose parameters Cu;K; T as specied by (33) ; (34) ; and
(35) ; and dene   T 2 ,via (20) T = 2( )1  : Suppose that the decision-maker receives recom-
mendation v2(a; 0) at time t = 20 for some a 2 [a ; 0]; and assigns probabilities qa; 1  qa to the
two types z(a); h(a) in his information set. Then: (i) if a2 > 8; there exist numbers 0 < 1 and
"  0:25; and a continuous function qa : [a ; 0] ! (0:3; 0:6); such that the DMs gain to deviating
is strictly negative whenever 0  0 and qa 2 (qa   "; qa + ") ; (ii) if a2  8; there exist numbers
0 < 1 and "  0:145; and a continuous function qa : [a ; 0] ! (0:2; 0:7) such that the DMs gain
to deviating is strictly negative whenever 0  0 and qa 2 (qa   "; qa + ") :
Proof of Proposition D5:
If the decision-maker follows recommendation v2(a; 0) (expecting to choose this action until
time T    ; then learn the truth); his expected disutility is
(T      20)

qa (v2(a; 0)  z(a))2 + (1  qa) (v2(a; 0)  h(a))2

+ (0)
The best possible deviation is to instead choose myopically optimal action qaz(a) + (1  qa)h(a) in
all remaining T   20 periods, for disutility
(T   2a)

qa (qaz(a) + (1  qa)h(a)  z(a))2 + (1  qa) (qaz(a) + (1  qa)h(a)  h(a))2

= (T   2)qa(1  qa) (h(a)  z(a))2
So, the gain to deviating is negative at any belief qa satisfying the following inequality:
0 >

qa (v2(a; 0)  z(a))2 + (1  qa) (v2(a; 0)  h(a))2

  (T   20)
(T      20)qa(1  qa) (h(a)  z(a))
2
= qa

2

v2(a; 0)  h(a)
h(a)  z(a)

+ 1

+

v2(a; 0)  h(a)
h(a)  z(a)
2
  2qa(1  qa); (36)
where 2  T   20
T      20 (37)
Solving, we need qa 2 (qa   "a; qa + "a) ; where
qa =
2   1  2

v2(a;0) h(a)
h(a) z(a)

22
(38)
"a =
p
2   1
22
s
  1  2

v2(a; 0)  h(a)
h(a)  z(a)

+ 1 + 2

v2(a; 0)  h(a)
h(a)  z(a)

(39)
By (19), (15) ; and (37) ; we have that v2(a;0) h(a)h(a) z(a) is continuous in both a and 0; and  is
continuous in 0; this establishes the desired continuity of qa in a; and also implies that qa; "a are
both continuous in 0: Then, to complete the proof, it is su¢ cient to show that (i) if a2 > 8;
then, in the limit as 0 ! 0; the value qa in (38) lies in (0:3; 0:6) 8a 2 [a ; 0]; and the value "a in
(39) is greater than 0:25 8a 2 [a ; 0]; (ii) if a2  8; then, in the limit as 0 ! 1; the value qa in
37
(38) lies in (0:2; 0:7) 8a 2 [a ; 0]; and the value "a in (39) is greater than 0:145.
To this end, we rst calculate bounds on 2

v2(a;0) h(a)
h(a) z(a)

: Substituting Cu = 1 00
K2
T 2 (from
(33)) into (19) ; we obtain that v2(a; 0)  h(a) equals
3 +
2K (a a)
T  +
q
40
T  20
r
(T )(T 2)

1 0
0
K2
T 2 +(
T  2
 )K2+2K(a a) T2 (a a)2
T    h(a)
=
2K   T (a  a)
T    +
s
2K
T   
2
+
20
(T   ) (T      20)

4K
T    (a  a) 
T
T    (a  a)
2

(40)
(second line uses 3   h(a) = a   a (from (15) and (14)) and simplies the square root term).
Setting k  2KT  ; t  TT  ; and y  a  a ; noting (using (37)) that 20(T )(T  20) = 2   t; and
multiplying by 2h(a) z(a) =
1
ey (by (15) with y = a  a); we can simplify further to:
2

v2(a; 0)  h(a)
h(a)  z(a)

=
k   ty +
q
k2 +
 
2   t (2ky   ty2)
ey
 (y)
ey
(41)
So we wish to obtain upper and lower bounds on the expression (y)ey in (41) ; for a 2 [a ; 0], y 2
[0; a ] : By construction, the value of K specied in (34) sets the square root portion of v1; v2
equal to zero at a = 0, y =  a (see Lemma D7.1), so we have
k = a

2   t+ 
q
2   t

(42)
Next, observe that
0(y) =  t+
 
2   t (k   ty)q
k2 +
 
2   t (2ky   ty2)
00(y) =
 k22(2   t)
k   ty +
q
k2 +
 
2   t (2ky   ty2) 32
both strictly negative, by 2 > t; k < 0; and y  0: Therefore, (y) reaches a maximum over the
interval y 2 [0; a ] at y = 0; and lies above the straight line connecting the points (0; (0)) and
( a ; ( a)) : since we have ( a) = k + ta and (0) = k +
p
k2 = 0; this line e is given by
e(y)  e(0) = e( a)  e(0) a (y   0)) e(y) = k + ta a y
Substituting in (42) ; we conclude that
min
y2[0; a ]
(y)
ey
 min
y2[0; a ]
e(y)
ey
=

 2   
q
2   t

max
y2[0; a ]
y
ey

=
 2   
p
2   t
e
max
y2[0; a ]
(y)
ey
 maxy2[0; a ] (y)
miny2[0; a ] ey
=
(0)
e0
= 0
38
And nally, substituting 2

v2(a;0) h(a)
h(a) z(a)

2

 2 
p
2 t
e ; 0

into (39) and (38) ; we obtain
qa 2
242   1
22
;
2   1 + 2+
p
2 t
e
22
35 (43)
min
a2[a ;0]
"a 
p
2   1
22
vuut(  1  0) + 1  2 + p2   t
e
!
(44)
We now complete the proof for a2 > 8,  > 0:79202: Consider the limit as 0 ! 0; in which
case 2 ! TT  = t; substituting t = 2 into (44) ; we obtain
min
a2[a ;0]
"a 
p
2   1
22
s
(  1)

+ 1  
2
e

This exceeds 14 whenever  2 (1:6545; 2:45); in which case (43) yields qa 2 (0:317 34; 0:600 64) 
(0:3; 0:6); the desired bounds. So, to complete the proof, we just need to show that (35) indeed
yields lim0!0  2 (1:6545; 2:45) : For this, recall that lim0!0 2  T2 =
1  

1  ; so that
 > 1:6545, 1 


1   > (1:6545)
2 ,  > 
2: 737 4   1: 737 4 (45)
 < 2:45, (6: 002 5   5: 002 5)  <  (46)
Substituting (45) into the equation T = 2( )1  ; we obtain the horizon constraint T >

5: 474 8
2:7374 1:7374

,
which is implied by the bound T > Tmin in (35) (noting that
5: 474 8
2:7374 1:7374 < 6 whenever  >
0:95203): The inequality in (46) is trivially satised by any horizon if   5:00256:0025 = 0:833 4; for
 > 0:8334, we need  < 6:0025 5:0025 , T < 12: 0056:0025 5:0025 ; which is implied by the bound
T < Tmax in (35) (noting that
12: 005
6:0025 5:0025 >
4 2
1  whenever  < 0:90913): As desired, this estab-
lishes that qa 2 (0:3; 0:6) and "a > 0:25; for any horizon T satisfying (35) and 0 su¢ ciently close
to zero.
Finally, we complete the proof for a2 < 8; in which case we consider the limit as 0 ! 1: Then,
2 ! T 2T  2 = 11  (using (20) ; in particular  = (T   2)); and t = TT  =
1  

1  ; substituting
into (43) and (44) ; we obtain
qa 2
26664
1
1    1
2
1 
;
1
1    1 +
1
1 +
q
1
1 
r
1
1  
1  

1 
e
2
1 
37775 =
264
2
;
 +
1+
q


e
2
375
min
a2[a ;0]
"a 
p

2
vuuut   1 p1  p
1  
0@1 +
q


e
1A
For the range  2 [0:4173; 0:50102); (35) species T = 7 ,  = 7 52 ; in this case, it may easily
be veried numerically that our lower bound on "a reaches a minimum (at  = 0:4172) of 0:163; our
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lower bound on qa is at least

2  0:41722 ; and our upper bound on qa is at most max
2[0:4172;0:50102]
 

2 +
1+
q
2
7 5
2e
!
=
0:521 30: For the range  2 [0:50102; 0:79202); (35) species  2 [2:5; 4]; over this range, it may
easily be veried numerically that our lower bound on "a is minimized at  = 0:79202; and is
increasing in ; with a minimum value (at  = 0:79202; = 2:5) of 0:14505 (any  2 [3:4] guar-
antees "a > 0:15); our lower bound on qa is at least 0:501022 > 0:25; and our upper bound on qa is at
most max
2[0:50102;0:79202]
 

2 +
1+
q

2:5
2e
!
= 0:7: As desired, this establishes that if we choose a horizon
T satisfying (35) and take 0 su¢ ciently close to 1, then qa 2 (0:2; 0:7) and "a > 0:145:
D.2.3 Optimality for the decision-maker: Deviations at time t = 0
Proposition D6: Fix a   1:773 ) b < 161 ; and choose parameters Cu; K; T satisfying (33) ;
(34) ; and (35) : There exists a continuous function pa : [ 2; 0] ! (0; 1); a number " > 0; and
numbers 0 < 0 < 00 < 1 such that if the DM receives recommendation u1(a; a) at time t  0 for
some a 2 [ 2; 0]; believes he is facing either type x(a) or g(a); and assigns probability pa to type
x(a); then (i) if a2 > 8; his gain to deviating is strictly negative whenever pa 2 (pa   "; pa + ")
and 0 < 0; (ii) if a2  8; his gain to deviating is strictly negative whenever pa 2 (pa  "; pa + ")
and 0 > 00:
Proof of Proposition D6: As explained in Observation D4, it su¢ ces to prove that the gain to
deviating is negative at time t = 0: Substituting x(a) = 3 + a  3ea and g(a) = 3 + a into (94) ;
we obtain that the decision-makers gain to deviating at time 0 at information set fx(a); g(a)g; if
he assigns probability pa to type x(a); is
= 2K2 + 4K (pa3e
a   a) + T (pa3ea   a)2   (T   2)pa(3ea)2 + 2(T   2)Cu
Substituting in (T   2)Cu = 1 00 K2 from (33) and simplifying, this becomes
2K2
0
+ 4K (pa3e
a   a) + T (pa3ea   a)2   (T   2)pa(3ea)2
Setting this expression to be negative and solving for pa; we nd that deviations are unprotable
so long as pa 2 (pa   "a; pa + "a) ; where
pa =
1
2
+
a
3ea
  1 +
2K
3ea
T
(47)
"a =
vuuuutT   2T
0B@1
4
+
a
3ea
 

1 + 2K3ea
2
2T
1CA  1  0
0

2K2
T (3ea)
2 (48)
So, noting the continuity in a; 0; it su¢ ces to take the limits of (47) ; (48) as 0 !
(
1 if a2  8
0 if a2 > 8
;
and to show that the expressions for pa; "a in (47) ; (48) satisfy pa 2 (0; 1) 8 2 [ 2; 0]; and
mina2[ 2;0] "a > 0: In what follows, it will be useful to recall the relationships 3e 2 = a 2+2e a
(from (14)), and  = T 2 , T = 2( )1  (using (20)).
If a2 > 8, a <  3:18;  > 0:79202; then consider the limit as 0 ! 0; and let 6  T  4 21 
(implied by (35)): Note that in this range, mina2[ 2;0] 3ea = 3e 2 = a 2+2e a > 40: By (34) ;
40
we have lim0!0

1 0
0

K2 =
Ta2
2(T ) and lim0!0K = 0; substituting into (48) ; we obtain
lim
0!0
"a =
s
T   2
T

1
4
+
a
3ea
  1
2T

  a
2

T   

1
3ea
2
This is increasing in a; and therefore reaches a minimum at a =  2) 3ea = a   2 + 2e a : so,
we have
min
a2[ 2;0]

lim
0!0
"a

=
s
T   2
2T
2
1 

8T
T   2

1
a   2 + 2e a

  
T   

a
a   2 + 2e a
2
(49)
We rst consider the nal subtracted term in (49) : using the relationship  = T 2 , T = 2( )1 
and our horizon restriction T  4 21  ,   2; we obtain T  =


1 
  
 1

  2(1 ) ; this is less
than (
a 2+2e a )2
2(2 a)(a 4+4e a ) by (20) ; so that

T 

a
a 2+2e a
2
<
a2
2(2 a)(a 4+4e a ) : Substituting
this into (49) ; noting that the resulting expression is strictly increasing in T; and using our horizon
restriction T  6; we then have:
min
a2[ 2;0]

lim
0!0
"a

>
s
1
9
  4
3

1
a   2 + 2e a

  a
2

2 (2  a) (a   4 + 4e a )
It may easily be veried graphically that this expression is increasing in  a ; with a lower bound,
at  a = 3:18; of approximately 0:263: On the other hand, (47) yields
lim
0!0
pa =
T   2
2T
+
a
3ea
Since maxa2[ 2;0] (lim0!0 pa) =
T 2
2T <
1
2 8T; and mina2[ 2;0] (lim0!0 pa) = T 22T   23e 2 > 412  
2
40 =
17
60 (by horizon restriction T  6 and the fact that a <  3:18) 3e 2 = a 2+2e a > 40);
this establishes the desired result, with "a > 0:25 and pa 2

17
60 ;
1
2

:
If a 2 [ 3:18; 2),  2 (:50102; :79202]; then consider the limit as 0 ! 1 : in this case, we
have
lim
0!1
"a =
vuuuutT   2T
0B@1
4
+
a
3ea
 

1 + 2K3ea
2
2T
1CA (50)
with K =
a
1  
 
1 +
s


!
; T =
2(  )
1   (using (34) , (20) at 0 = 1) (51)
Recall that in this range, (35) species  2 [2:5; 4] , T 2
h
5 2
1  ;
8 2
1 
i
and implies T > 6: To
prove that mina2[ 2;0] "a > 0, it su¢ ces to show that for any  2 [2:5; 4] and a 2 [ 3:18; 2]; the
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following two results hold:
(i) :

1 +
2K
3ea
2
 1  "0; for some "0 > 0 (52)
(ii) :
1
2T
 1
4
  2
3e 2
(53)
To see this, substitute (52) and (53) into (50) ; to obtain
lim
0!1
"a >
s
T   2
T

1
4
  2
3e 2
  1  "
0
2T

(by (52) and
d
da
a
3ea
> 0)
>
s
T   2
T

"0
2T

(by (53))
Strictly positive as desired, since "0 > 0 and T > 6: For pa 2 (0; 1); note that (52) implies
1 + 2K3ea

2 ( 1; 1); substituting this into (47) ; we obtain
min
a2[ 2;0]

1
2
+
a
3ea
  1
T

 lim
0!1
pa  max
a2[ 2;0]

1
2
+
a
3ea
   1
T

, pa 2

2

1
4
  1
3e 2
  1
2T

;
1
2
+
1
T

By (53) (for the lower bound) and T  6 (for the upper bound), this implies pa 2 (0; 1); as desired.
So, to complete the range for a 2 [ 3:18; 2); we just need to prove that  2 [2:5; 4] implies
(52) and (53) : To prove (52) ; it su¢ ces to set "0 =

 4K
3

1 + K
3e 2

; and to prove that  2
[2:5; 4] and a 2 [ 3:18; 2]) 1 + K3e 2 > 0 : then, since it is immediate from (51) that  4K3 > 0;
well have
0 < "0 
 4K
3

1 +
K
3e 2

< min
a2[ 2;0]
 4K
3ea

1 +
K
3ea

= min
a2[ 2;0]
 
1 

1 +
2K
3ea
2!
which rearranges to yield

1 + 2K3ea
2
< 1  "0 8a 2 [ 2; 0]; as desired. To this end, we rst solve
for the values of  that guarantee 1 + K
3e 2 > 0 : substituting (51) into this inequality, along with
the relationship 3e 2 = a   2 + 2e a ; and then solving for ; we obtain
 <
1


2 (1  ) (e a   1) + a
 a
2
(54)
To prove that this is satised by any  2 [2:5; 4], it su¢ ces to prove that the upper bound in (54)
exceeds 4. For this, it is su¢ cient (by  < 1) 1 > 1) that
2 (1  ) (e a   1) + a
 a > 2, 2 (1  )
 
e a   1+ 3a > 0
Substituting 1    = (2 a)(a 4+4e
 a )
4e a (e a 1) (from (20)) into this inequality and multiplying through
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by 2e a ; it becomes
(2  a)
 
a   4 + 4e a

+ 6ae
 a > 0
The LHS of this expression is strictly concave (2nd derivative w.r.t. a is 2 (2 + a) e a 2; which is
strictly negative by a   2); and therefore it reaches a minimum over the interval a 2 [ 3:18; 2]
at either a =  3:18; of 5:5562; or at a =  2; of 2.2443; we can therefore conclude that the RHS of
(54) is at least 4, and so (54) is indeed satised by any  2 [2:5; 4]; as needed to complete the proof
of (52) : For (53) ; we need to show that  2 [2:5; 4] implies that
1
2T
 1
4
  2
3e 2
, T  2 (a   2 + 2e
 a )
(a   2 + 2e a )  8
Substituting T = 2 21  (from   T 2 and (20) ; in particular  = (T   2)) into this inequality,
it becomes
  
1   
(a   2 + 2e a )
(a   2 + 2e a )  8 ,  

a   2 + 2e a   8
a   2 + 2e a   8

To complete the proof, it then su¢ ces to show that
a 2 [ 3:18; 2))

a   2 + 2e a   8
a   2 + 2e a   8

 2:5
, rearranging3
 
a   2 + 2e a

+ 16  40
Using (20) ; the LHS is strictly decreasing in a ; with a minimum value, at a =  2; of 40:331;
thus satisfying the inequality. This completes the proof of (53) ; and hence of Proposition D6 for
a 2 [ 3:18; 2):
Finally, we prove Proposition D6 for a 2 [ 2; 1:773]: Again consider the limit as 0 ! 1; so
that (50) ; (47) ; (51) continue to hold. First, we note that (35) implies K + T  0 :
K + T  0, a
1  
 
1 +
s


!
+
2(  )
1    0,   

1  a
2
2
(55)
Since a   2) 
 
1  a2
2  4; this holds for any  4; by (35) ; we have T = 7)  = 7 52 ;
and since a   2)   0:50102 < 713 ) 7 52 > 4; we conclude that (55) indeed holds, and so
K + T  0: Next, we note that K + T  0 implies that lim0!1 "a is minimized (over our interval
a 2 [ 2; 0]) at either a =  2 or a = 0 : for this, we just need to show that d
2(lim0!1 "a)
da2
< 0; which
follows from di¤erentiating (50) to obtain
d2"a
da2
=
  8K2 + Ta3ea   2(K + T )3ea
T (3ea)
2 < 0 (by a < 0 and K + T  0)
This is negative, by a < 0 and K + T  0: So, to prove that lim0!1 "a > 0 8a 2 [ 2; 0]; we
just need to show that lim0!1 "a > 0 at a 2 f 2; 0g: For lim0!1 "0 > 0 : since a   1:773 )
3 = (a   2 + 2e a ) e2 > 59; and 0 > K   T =  7; we have 1 > 1 + 2K3 > 1   1459 ; so that
1 + 2K3
2
< 1; substituting this into (50) evaluated at a = 0; we obtain
lim
0!1
"0 =
1
4
 

1 + 2K3
2
2T
>
1
4
  1
2(7)
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Strictly positive, as desired. For lim0!1 " 2 > 0; evaluate (50) at a =  2 and T = 7; recalling
from (14) that 3e 2 = a   2 + 2e a ; to obtain
" 2 =
1
4
  2
a   2 + 2e a  

1 + 2K
a 2+2e a
2
14
> 0 whenever

1 +
2K
a   2 + 2e a
2
< 14

1
4
  2
a   2 + 2e a

(56)
Substituting T = 7 )  = 7 52 and (20) into (51) to obtain K as a function of a ; it may easily
be veried numerically that (56) holds i¤ a >  1:7743; implied for the range under consideration.
This completes the proof that " 2 > 0; and hence that mina2[ 2;0] "a > 0: Finally, to prove that
pa 2 (0; 1) : rst, a 2 [ 2; 1:773] implies that the RHS expression in (56) is between 0 and 1,
and therefore (56) implies that

1 + 2K
3e 2
2
< 1; using this, together with K < 0 and the fact that
2K
3ea
is increasing in a; we then have
1 > 1 +
2K
3
 1 + 2K
3ea
 1 + 2K
3e 2
>  1 (57)
Substituting

1 + 2K3ea

2 ( 1; 1) into (47) ; together with a3ea 2 [  23e 2 ; 0] and T = 7; we obtain
pa 2
h
1
2   23e 2   17 ; 12 + 17
i
; the upper bound is clearly below 1, and the lower bound is at least
3
28 by a   1:773) 3e 2 > 8; so pa 2 (0; 1); as desired.
D.2.4 Optimality for the decision-maker: Completing the Proof
As explained at the beginning of this section, it remains only to prove that there is an open set of
priors generating posteriors which satisfy the conditions in Propositions D5, D6, which we prove
here.
Proposition D7: For any 0 <  <  < 1 and continuous functions p : [ 2; 0] ! [; 1];
q : [a ; 0] ! [; 1]; and r : [a ; 0] ! [0; ] , there exists a density f over the state space
such that, in our construction, a Bayesian decision-maker will hold the following posterior be-
liefs: (i) Pr (x(a)jfx(a); g(a)g) = p(a); (ii) Pr (z(a)jfz(a); h(a)g) = q(a); (iii) Pr(fz(a); h(a)g j
fz(a); h(a); x(ba); g(ba)g = r(a): Then, since we proved that the equilibrium works for the DM when-
ever p(a) 2 (pa "; pa+") (for some continuous pa : [ 2; 0]! (0; 1) and " > 0, see Proposition D6),
q(a) 2 (q   "; q + ") (for some continuous qa : [a ; 0]! (0; 1) and " > 0; see Proposition D5), and
r(a) < "0 (for some "0 > 0; see section D.2.1), with pa; qa; 1 ra bounded away from zero, it follows
we can nd some "00 > 0 such that our construction works also for any perturbation of the prior
which does not change the density at any point by more than "00: As desired, this constructs an
open set of prior distributions for which our construction constitutes a fully revealing equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition D7: Bayesian beliefs satisfy
Pr (x(a)jfx(a); g(a)g)
Pr (g(a)jfx(a); g(a)g) =
f(x(a))
f(g(a))
(3e
a   1) (58a)
Pr (z(a)jfz(a); h(a)g)
Pr (h(a)jfz(a); h(a)g) =
f (z(a))
f(h(a))
 
2ea a   1 (58b)
Pr(fz(a); h(a)g)
Pr (fx(ba); g(ba)g) = f(z(a))f(bx(a))

2ea a   1
3eba(a)   1

1
jba0(a)j

p(ba)
q(a)

(58c)
where ba(a) = u 11 (v1(a0)) (as explained in Section D.3). We want the expression in (58a) to equal
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p(a)
1 p(a) , the expression in (58b) to equal
q(a)
1 q(a) ; and the expression in (58c) to equal
r(a)
1 r(a) . It is
straightforward to construct such a density f : for example, for each a 2 [ 2; 0]; set f(x(a)) = 1M ;
with M a constant to be determined (this assigns a density for types x(a) 2 [0; 1]). Then, assign
probabilities to types g(a) 2 [2; 3] by setting the RHS of (58a) equal to p(a)1 p(a) ; substituting in
f(x(a)) = 1M ; and solving for f(g(a)); to obtain
f(g(a)) = f(x(a))(3e
a   1)

1  p(a)
p(a)

=
(3e
a   1)
M
1  p(a)
p(a)
Next, for each a 2 [a ; 0]; set the RHS of (58c) equal to r(a)1 r(a) ; replace the nal RHS term of (5)
with p(ba)q(a) ; sub in f(x(ba)) = 1M , and solve for f(z(a)), to obtain
f(z(a)) =
q(a)
p(ba) 3eba(a) 12ea a 1  jba0(a)j
M
r(a)
1  r(a)
(This assigns a prior for types z(a) 2 [1; 2]). And similarly, use this and (58b) to assign beliefs to
types h(a) 2 [3; 1b ]; obtaining
f(h(a)) =
q(a)
p(ba(a)))  3eba(a)   1  jba0(a)j
M

r(a)
1  r(a)

1  q(a)
q(a)

Finally, choose M so that the total measure of the type space integrates to 1 (This is possible since
(16) ; (18) imply that u1; v1 and their derivatives w.r.t. a are nite and non-zero except perhaps at
a single point a; from which it follows that jba0(a)j is bounded; since we also have p(a)  ; q(a)  ;
and 1  r(a)  1  ; it follows that all of the specied densities f(x(a)); f(g(a)); f(z(a)); f(h(a))
are nite numbers divided by a number M . So, integrating over the state space yields a nite
number divided by M ; choose M so that this equals 1).
D.2.5 Optimality for the decision-maker: Preliminary Calculations
Lemma D7.1: Let Cu; K; and T be given by (33) ; (34) ; and (35) ; and dene   T 2 (so
that, using  = (T   2); we have T = 2( )1  ): Then: (i) if a2 > 8; there exists 0 > 0 such
that whenever 0 < 0; the functions u1; u2; v1; v2 specied in (16)-(19) are real-valued; moreover,
there exists a continuous decreasing function a : [ 2; 0] ! [0; 1) such that 8a 2 [a ; 0]; there
exists ea 2 [ 2; 0] with v1(a; 0) = u1 (ea; (ea)) ; (ii) if a2  8; there exists 0 < 1 such that
whenever 0 > 0; the functions u1; u2; v1; v2 specied in (16)-(19) are real-valued; moreover,
v1(a; 0) 2 [u1(0; 0); u1( 2; 0)] 8a 2 [a ; 0]; (iii) (modication to (i), needed only for the next
subsection Integer Constraints): if a2 > 8 and Cu;K are as given by (33) ; (34) ; then part (i)
holds also at T = 6; 0 = 0:1:
Proof of Lemma D7.1:
45
Substituting (33) into (16) ; (17) ; (18) ; (19) ; our action functions become:
u1(a; a) = 3 +K   T   2
2
a 
r
1  a
a
s
1  0
0
K2 + (T   2)a

K   T
4
a

(59)
u2(a; a) = 3 +K   T   2
2
a+
r
1  a
a
s
1  0
0
K2 + (T   2)a

K   T
4
a

(60)
v1(a; 0) = 3 +
2K (a a)
T   
r
(T  20)
0
r
T  20


K2
0
+2K(a a) T2 (a a)2
T  (61)
v2(a; 0) = 3 +
2K (a a)
T  +
q
40
T  20
r
T  20


K2
0
+2K(a a) T2 (a a)2
T  (62)
We rst prove that v1; v2 are real-valued 80: For this, we need to show that the following
expression is non-negative, for all a 2 [a ; 0] :
T      20


K2
0
+ 2K (a  a)  T
2
(a  a)2 (63)
For this, observe that the expression in (63) is decreasing in a (the derivative w.r.t. a is 2K T (a 
a); which is strictly negative, since (34) implies K < 0); therefore, the expression in (63) reaches
a minimum over the interval a 2 [a ; 0] at a = 0; and so it is su¢ cient to prove that this minimum
value is non-negative: that is, we need
T      20


K2
0
  2Ka   T
2
a2  0
The value for K specied in (34) is precisely the negative root of this equation, and so we conclude
that v1; v2 are real-valued for all values of a; 0:
Next, we prove that u1; u2 are real-valued for 0 near zero when a2 > 8; and for 0 near 1
when a2  8: To this end: for u1; u2 to be real-valued, we need to choose 0 such that
min
a2[ 2;0]

1  0
0
K2 + (T   2)a

K   T
4
a

 0 (64)
The second derivative of the bracketed expression w.r.t. a is  T (T 2)2 < 0; implying that the
minimum value over the interval a 2 [ 2; 0] is attained at one of the two endpoints. If at a = 0;
then (64) becomes 1 00 K
2  0; trivially satised 80 2 [0; 1]; if at a =  2; then we need
1  0
0
K2   (T   2) (2K + T )  0 (65)
Suppose rst that a2 > 8; and consider the limit as 0 ! 0 : by (34) ; we have lim0!0K = 0;
and lim0!0
1 0
0
K2 =
T (T 2)a2
2(T ) ; so we have
lim
0!0

1  0
0
K2   (T   2) (2K + T )

= T (T   2)
 
a2
2(T   )   1
!
This is strictly positive, since a2 > 8; and (35) species (T   )  4 in this range; therefore, (65)
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is satised with strict inequality in the limit as 0 ! 0; and therefore, by continuity, holds also for
0 su¢ ciently close to zero. If a2  8; then consider the limit as 0 ! 1: For (64) ; it is su¢ cient
to prove that
2K + T  0,  K  T
2
Substituting in (34) ; taking limits as 0 ! 1; and using T2 =  1  ; this becomes
( a)
1  
 
1 +
s


!
   
1   , ( a)
 
1 +
s


!
 

  1
This is satised by any
q

 2 [0; 1  a ] , 0    (1   a)2; which is implied by (35) : in
the range a 2 [ 3:18; 2) ,  2 (:50102; :79202]; we have (1   a)2  :50102(1 + 2)2 > 4;
while (35) species  2 [2:5; 4]; and in the range a 2 [ 2; 1:773),  2 (:4172; :50102]; we have
(1   a)2  :4172(1 + 1:773)2 > 3; while (35) species T = 7 ,  = 7 52 < 3: As desired, this
establishes that u1; u2 are real-valued under the Lemma conditions.
Finally, we prove the desired overlap of functions u1; v1: We begin by computing the range of
v1 : di¤erentiating (61) ; we obtain
T   

@v1(a; 0)
@a
=  1 +
T
2 (a  a) Kr
K2 + 0T  20

2K (a  a)  T2 (a  a)2

T   

@2v1(a; 0)
@a2
=
r
T      20
0
1
2
K2
0
(T   ) (T   20)r
T  20
0
K2 + 

2K (a  a)  T2 (a  a)2
3
Since @
2v1(a;0)
@a2
is strictly positive, we conclude that T 
@v1(a;0)
@a is strictly increasing over the
interval a 2 [a ; 0]; and therefore reaches a minimum value, at a = a ; of
min
a

T   

@v1(a; 0)
@a

=  1 +  Kp
K2
= 0 (since K < 0 by (34) )
So v1 is increasing on [a ; 0]; and so we have
min
a2[a ;0]
v1(a; 0) = v1(a ; 0) = 3 +
2K
T   
r
(T  20)
0
r
T  20
0

K2
T  = 3 +
K
0
(66)
max
a2[a ;0]
v1(a; 0) = v1(0; 0) = 3 +
2K+a
T  (67)
(The nal equality uses the fact that, by construction, (34) sets the square rooted portion of
v1(0; 0) equal to zero). So to complete the proof, by continuity in a; 0; a; it su¢ ces to prove that
(i) if a2 > 8 and 0 is su¢ ciently close to zero; then u1(0; 0)  mina v1(a; 0); and u1( 2; 1) >
maxa v1(a; 0);
27 and (ii) if a2  8 and 0 is su¢ ciently close to 1, then u1(0; 0)  mina v1(a; 0);
and u1( 2; 0)  maxa v1(a; 0) (so the range of the function v1(a; 0) is completely contained in
the range of u1(a; 0); so the desired overlap follows).
27So, if we set a(0) = 0; and a( 2) close to 1, and then choose a() to be any continuous function connecting
these two points, then we will have mina u1(a; a(a))  min v1; and maxa u1(a; a(a))  max v1; with u1(a; a(a))
continuous in a; since the range of v1 is completely contained in the range of u1; the desired overlap then follows.
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To this end, evaluate (59) at (a = 0; a = 0) and (a =  2; a); to obtain
u1(0; 0) = 3 +K  
r
1  0
0
r
1  0
0
K2 = 3 +
K
0
(68)
u1( 2; a) = 3 +K + T   2 
r
1  a
a
r
1  0
0
K2   (T   2) (2K + T ) (69)
Comparing (68) and (66) ; we immediately have u1(0; 0)  mina v1(a; 0); as desired. So, it
remains to prove that (i) if a2  8; then lim0!1

u1( 2; 0) 

3 +
2K+a
T 

> 0; and (ii) if
a2 > 8; then lim0!0

u1( 2; 1) 

3 +
2K+a
T 

> 0: For (i), suppose a2 > 8; and consider
the limit as 0 ! 0 : then, using lim0!0K = 0 and lim0!0 1 00 K2 =
T (T 2)a2
2(T ) , we have
lim
0!0
u1( 2; a) = 3 + T   2 
r
1  a
a
s
T (T   2)

a2
2(T   )   1

At a = 1; we then have
lim
0!0

u1( 2; a)  max
a2[a ;0]
v1(a; 0)

= (3 + T   2  0) 

3 +
a
T   

= (T   2)

1  a
T   

Strictly positive, as desired, by a < 0:
For (ii), let a2  8; and use (69) and (67) to obtain
u1( 2; 0)  max
a2[a ;0]
v1(a; 0) = K + T   2 
r
1  0
0
r
1  0
0
K2   (T   2) (2K + T )  2K+aT 
Using  = (T   2) and  = T 2 ; and taking limits as 0 ! 1; we then wish to show that the
following expression is positive:
lim
0!1

  1

K + (T   2)

1  a
2

 
r
1  0
0
r
1  0
0
K2   (T   2) (2K + T )

=

  1
1  
0@2 
s
a2

1A
Since a2  8; this is strictly positive, as desired, for any  > 2; which is implied by (35) :
Finally, for (iii), let a2 > 8 , a <  3:18;  > :79202; and set T = 6; 0 = :1: Here,
by (34) ; we have K = 2a29 20

1 +
q
293 22

<  2:3317 (this is the value at a =  3:18 and
 = :79202); which guarantees that (65) is satised (so u1; u2 are real-valued). For the overlap of
u1; v1; we can construct the function a : [ 2; 0] ! [0; 1] by setting a(0) = 0 = 0:1 (so that
u1(0; a(0)) = mina2[a ;0] v1(a; 0); as shown after (68)), and then setting a( 2) = maxf0; g;
where  satises u1( 2; ) = maxa2[a ;0] v1(a; 0); by (69) ; (67) ; evaluated at T = 6; 0 = 0:1;
this requires r

1   =
p
9K2   4 (2K + 6)
4 + 23 2 ((1  )K   a)
(70)
Note that this can always be satised by some  2 (0; 1) : the LHS can take on any positive value,
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the RHS numerator is guaranteed to be real-valued by our proof that u1; u2 are real-valued, and
the RHS denominator rearranges, at T = 6; 0 = 0:1; to0BBB@ 2a3  2| {z }
<0 by a<0
1CCCA
0BBBB@

1  
29  20
 
1 +
s
29
3  2
2
!
  1| {z }
decreasing in ; max value  0:90373 at =:79202
+
6  4
a| {z }
<0 by a<0; <1
1CCCCA > 0
Then: if maxf0; g = 0; implying that u1( 2; 0) > maxa2[a ;0] v1(a; 0); set a(a) = 0
8a 2 [ 2; 0]; if maxfa; g = ; then let a : [ 2; 0]! [0; 1] be any continuous strictly decreas-
ing function with a(0) = 0; a( 2) =  > 0; either way, u1(a; a(a)) will then be continuous in
a; with [u1(0; 0); u1( 2; a( 2)]  [ min
a2[a ;0]
v1(a; 0); max
a2[a ;0]
v1(a; 0)]; implying the desired over-
lap: any recommendation v1(a; 0) sent by pair fz(a); h(a)g with a 2 [a ; 0]; coincides with the
recommendation u1(ea; a(ea)) of some pair fx(ea); g(ea)g with ea 2 [ 2; 0]; with u1 recommended for
at least as long.
D.2.6 Integer Constraints
If time is discrete, so that there is an integer constraint on the times at which the expert change
his advice, then our construction is most easily modied via a combination of public randomization
and scaling up.
If a2  8; the modication is straightforward. We rst can show that all results of Lemma
D7.1 and Propositions D5, D6 hold also at 0 = 0:9 (our original proof uses 0 near 1 in this
range):28 Next, choose an integer T satisfying (35), and then scale everything up by a factor of
5: that is, actions u1; v1 are now recommended for 5(20) = 9 periods, u2 for 5(2(1   0)) = 1
period (after which Group II; III types reveal the truth), and the game now lasts 5T periods. The
only di¢ culty is the time at which Group I pairs reveal the truth, originally T    ; with (by (20))
 = (T   2);  2 (0; 1) a continuous function of the bias: for most biases, if 5T is an integer, then
5(T   ) is not. The easiest solution is to choose the two integers t1 < 5(T   ) < t2 closest to
5(T ); and then use a public randomization device to determine whether the expert should reveal
the truth at t1; t2; with probabilities chosen such that the expected revelation time is 5(T   ): So
long as this randomization does not take place until time t1, all expected payo¤s are unchanged for
both players, at all times when they must decide whether or not to follow the prescribed strategies.
So, we again have a fully revealing equilibrium.
If a2 > 8; then we can show that all results of Propositions D5, D6 continue to hold at
T = 6 and 0 = 0:1; and that all actions are real-valued at these parameters. Now, again scale all
time parameters up by a factor of 5, and employ public randomization as above to deal with an
integer constraint on the time at which Group I pairs reveal the truth. The new complication for
this range is the time at which pairs fx(a); g(a)g (with a 2 [ 2; 0]) switch from recommendation
u1(a; a) to u2(a; a) : in expectation, we now want this to occur at time 5(2a) = 10a; where
a : [ 2; 0] ! [0; 1] is a (necessarily) continuous function chosen in Lemma D7.1 to guarantee
overlap of u1; v1 : for these parameters, a () takes on a minimum value, at a = 0; of a(0) =
0 = 0:1; and a maximum value, at a =  2; of a( 2) = ; with  2 (0; 1) dened by (70) :
Since 10a potentially takes on all values in the interval [100; 10] = [1; 10]; we clearly cannot
just scale upto get integers. So, consider using public randomization: for each a 2 [ 2; 0] and
the corresponding value a(a) 2 [0; 1]; choose the integer n 2 f1; 2; :::; 9g satisfying the condition
28For brevity of exposition, we do not include the proof of this claim here, but it is available on request. If the
reader does not wish to take our word for it: our original proof (Theorem 1 without integer constraints) shows, for
this range, that there exists  > 0 such that we have an equilibrium whenever 0 < : So, one could apply our
argument here by simply choosing any 0 2 (0; ) (rather than 0 = :1); and then scaling up by 120 (rather than
by 5). We describe the integer modication here using 0 = 0:1 simply because we have veried that it works, and
we wish to illustrate that one need not scale up the horizon by an astronomical amount to obtain an equilibrium in
discrete time.
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10a(a) 2 [n; n+1]; if 10a(a) 2 (n; n+1); then use public randomization (in period n) to determine
whether the expert should switch to u2 after n or n + 1 periods, such that the expected duration
of u1(a; a(a)) is 10a(a). In expectation, nothing changes for the expert when he makes his
rst recommendation (recall that all subsequent expert deviations are deterred in our construction
simply via the DMs o¤-path beliefs), and nothing changes for the DM except for the period n in
which the outcome of the public randomization is determined: here, the DM must now prefer both
(i) choosing u1 for one more period, then u2 for 9   n more periods, then learning the truth; and
(ii) choosing u2 for 10  n periods, then learning the truth; to deviating to the myopically optimal
action in all remaining 5T n periods. Letting D1(a; a); D2(a; a); D(a) denote (respectively) the
DMs expected per-period disutility from choosing u1(a; a); u2(a; a); and the myopically optimal
action, given posterior beliefs that assign probabilities p(a); 1  p(a) to the two types x(a); g(a) in
his information set, we can write these interim IC constraints as:
D1(a; a) + (9  n)D2(a; a)  (5T   n)D(a) (71)
(10  n)D2(a; a)  (5T   n)D(a) (72)
Our original construction proved that there was an interval of values for p(a) (which by Proposition
D7 could be generated by an open set of priors) for which the following ex ante incentive constraint
was satised, 8a 2 [ 2; 0] :
2aD1(a; a) + 2(1  a)D2(a; a)  TD(a) (73)
Constraint (71) is implied by (73): to see this, we just need to show that
D1(a; a) + (9  n)D2(a; a) + nD(a)
5
 2aD1(a; a) + 2(1  a)D2(a; a)
, D(a) 

10a   1
n

D1(a; a) +

n+ 1  10a
n

D2(a; a)
This follows since the RHS is a weighted average of D1(a; a) and D2(a; a), which are both
strictly greater than D(a); by denition of D(a) as the DMs lowest possible per-period disutility.
Constraint (72) ; however, represents a new constraint, not guaranteed to hold in our original
construction.29 So, to prove that our modied construction constitutes an equilibrium, it remains
to prove that 8a 2 [ 2; 0]; and for an interval of values for p(a); constraint (72) is satised.
For this: by denition of D2(a; a) and D(a); , we have
D2(a; a)
D(a)
=
p(a) (u2(a; a)  x(a))2 + (1  p(a)) (u2(a; a)  g(a))2
p(a)  (p(a)x(a) + (1  p(a))g(a)  x(a))2 + (1  p(a)) (p(a)x(a) + (1  p(a))g(a)  g(a))2
Using (60) and (15) ; this simplies to
D2(a; a)
D(a)
=
p(a) + 2p(a)X(a; a) + (X(a; a))
2
p(a) (1  p(a))
where X(a; a) 
K   T2 a+
q
a
1 a
q
1 0
0
K2 + (T   2)a  K   T4 a
3ea
29The DM dislikes u2 more than u1; so is not willing to choose it for too much longer than the expected duration.
This is one reason we have scaled everything up, rather than employing public randomization alone: to create a
ner time grid, so realized and expected times can be made close. The other reason is that the experts expected
payo¤, at the time when he makes his initial recommendation, must be the same as in our original construction.
Without scaling up, this would require that he expect his rst recommendation to last 20 when he makes it: this
is problematic when 20 < 1:
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Substituting this into (72) ; which rearranges as D2(a;a)D(a) 
T n
5
2 n
5
; setting p(a)  p for notational
convenience, and evaluating at T = 6; 0 = 0:1; we can solve (72) as follows:
X(a; a) 2
"
 p 
r
20p(1  p)
10  n ; p+
r
20p(1  p)
10  n
#
8a 2 [ 2; 0] (74)
with X(a; a) =
K   3a+
q
a
1 a
q
9K2 + 4a
 
K   32a

3ea
(75)
So to complete the proof, it su¢ ces to prove existence of a value p 2 (0; 1) such that the following
two inequalities hold:
max
a2[ 2;0]; a2[0;1)
X(a; a) <  p+
r
20p(1  p)
10  n (76)
min
a2[ 2;0]; a2[0;1)
X(a; a) >  p 
r
20p(1  p)
10  n (77)
By continuity, it will then follow that 8a 2 [ 2; 0] and 8a 2 [a0; 1); there is an interval of values
for p(a) such that (74) ; hence (72) ; is satised.
To this end, we rst note that X(a; a) is strictly decreasing in a; for any xed a : to show
this, it is su¢ cient by (75) to prove that 0 > dda
q
9K2+4a(K  32a)
ea ; that is,
0 >
2K   6a   9K2 + 4a  K   32aq
9K2 + 4a
 
K   32a

ea
(78)
The numerator in (78) is strictly convex; and therefore it reaches a maximum value at either a = 0;
of 2K   9K2 < 0 (by K < 0); or at a =  2; where it is again negative 8K <  1:5202; which is
implied by (34) for the range under consideration (T = 6; 0 = 0:1; and a2 > 8) K <  2:3317):
We conclude that (78) holds, and so X(a; a) is maximized (given a) at a =  2; minimized at
a = 0; it is immediate that X(a; a) is increasing in a; and we have from Lemma D7.1 (iii) that
a  0:1; and a   ( as given by (70)): Substituting these values into (75) ; and using (14) to
write 3e 2 = a   2 + 2e a ; we then have:
min
a2[ 2;0];a2[0:1)
X(a; a) = X(0; 0) =
K +
q
:1
1 :1
p
9K2
3ea
= 0 (79)
max
a2[ 2;0]; a2[0;1)
X(a; a) = X( 2; ) =
K + 6 + 9K
2 8K 24
4+ 2
3 2 ((1 )K a)
a   2 + 2e a (80)
Then, we trivially have that (77) is satised for any p 2 (0; 1); since the RHS is strictly negative,
while the LHS is at least zero by (79) : So, it remains to prove that there exists p 2 (0; 1) for which
51
(76) is satised, 8a <  3:18; substituting (80) into (76) ; it becomes
K + 6 + 9K
2 8K 24
4+ 2
3 2 ((1 )K a)
a   2 + 2e a < maxp2(0;1)
 
 p+
r
20p(1  p)
10  n
!
; 8n 2 f1; 2; ::; 9g (81)
where K =
2a

1 +
r
29

3
2   1

29  20 (82)
(2nd line obtained by evaluating (34) at T = 6; 0 = 0:1): The RHS of (81) reaches a maximum
value, at p = 12

1 
r
2 n
5
6 n
5

2 (0; 12); of 12
r
6 n
5
2 n
5
  1

: this is strictly increasing in n; and
therefore at least 12
r
6  1
5
2  1
5
  1

= 0:397 53 for n 2 f0; 1; :::; 9g: To show that the LHS of (81) is
below this for any a <  3:18; note that (34) implies that ((1  )K   a) > 0 (for all values
of ; a in the range under consideration), and that 9K2   8K   24 > 0 (by a <  3:18 ) K <
 2:3317); then, the LHS of (81) satises
K + 6 + 9K
2 8K 24
4+ 2
3 2 ((1 )K a)
a   2 + 2e a <
K + 6 + 9K
2 8K 24
4
a   2 + 2e a =
 
3K
2
2  K
a   2 + 2e a
Using (82) and (20) ; it may easily be shown that this expression

( 3K2 )
2 K
a 2+2e a

is strictly increasing
in a (going to zero as a !  1); with a maximum value, at a =  3:18 ) K =  2:3317; of
0:33919; therefore our su¢ cient condition (81) is indeed satised 8a <  3:18 and 8n 2 f1; :::; 9g,
as desired to complete the proof.
D.3 Derivations
In this supplementary section, we explain how the functions and parameters in our fully revealing
construction were chosen.
D.3.1 For the Expert:
Suppose we wanted an equilibrium in which each type  2 [0; 1] pools with a type g() 2 [2; 3];
to recommend an action u1() in period 1, u2() in period 2, and then reveal the truth for the
nal T   2 periods. The disutilities to types ; g() from following (respectively) the strategies
prescribed for types 0; g(0) are then
Du(
0j) =  u1(0)     12 +  u2(0)     12 + (T   2)  0      12 (83)
Du(g(
0)jg()) =  u1(0)  g()  12 +  u2(0)  g()  12 + (T   2)  g(0)  g()  12
In order for this to be an equilibrium, it must be that Du(0j) reaches a minimum over [0; 1] at
0 =  (so that type  earns a lower disutility by telling the truth than by mimicking any other type
0 in the interval [0; 1]), and that Du(g(0)jg()) reaches a minimum at g(0) = g(): We can do
this by simply choosing functions that satisfy the corresponding rst- and second-order conditions:
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beginning with the F.O.C.s, we need
0 =
1
2
dDu(
0j)
d0

0=
= u01() (u1()     1)) + u02() (u2()     1)  (T   2) (84)
0 =
1
2
dDu(g(
0)jg())
dg(0)

0=
=
u01()
g0()
(u1()  g()  1) + u
0
2()
g0()
(u2()  g()  1)  (T   2)(85)
Subtracting the 2nd expression from the 1st, we get 
u01() + u
0
2()

(g()  ) = (T   2)(1  g0())
If we dene a()  ln g() g(1) 1 ; so that a0() =
g0() 1
g()  ; this becomes
u01() + u
0
2() =  (T   2)a0()) u1() + u2() = ku   (T   2)a(); ku a constant (86)
Now: the disutility from telling the truth is
Du(j)  Du() = (u1()     1)2 + (u2()     1)2 + (T   2) (87)
) D
0
u()
2
= (u01()  1) (u1()     1) +
 
u02()  1

(u2()     1)
Substituting (84) into this expression, we get
D0u()
2
= T   2  (u1() + u2()) + 2( + 1)
= T + 2   ku + (T   2)a() (by (86) )
Integrating w.r.t. ; we get
Du() = Du(0) + 2 (T +    ku)  2(T   2)
Z 
0
(a(0))d0
Setting u1(0)  u0 and using expression (86) to obtain u2(0) = ku  (T   2)a(0)  u1(0) = ku  u0;
this becomes
Du() = (u0   1)2 + (ku   u0   1)2 + (T   2)| {z }
Du(0)
+ 2(T +    ku) + 2(T   2)
Z 
0
a(0)d0
= 2

ku
2
  u0
2
+ 2

ku
2
     1
2
+ 2 (T   2) + 2(T   2)
Z 
0
a(0)d0 + (T   2)
It will be convenient to change variables: rather than describing g as a function from [0; 1] !
[2; 3]; and using a()  ln g() g(0) 0 ; we ipvariables, describing each type  2 [0; 1] as a para-
metric function x(a) of the variable a; and each type in [2; 3] as a parametric function g(a) of
the variable a; where a takes on all values between 0 and a1 = ln
g(1) 1
g(0) 0 , and g(a); x(a) hold the
relationship (g(a)  x(a)) = (g(0)  x(0)) ea: With this, rewriting R 0 a(0)d0 as R a0 sx0(s)ds; and
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noting that  =
R a
0 x
0(s)ds; our above disutility expression for type  = x(a) becomes
Du(x(a)) = 2

ku
2
  x(a)  1
2
+ 2(T   2)
Z a
0
(s+ 1)x0(s)ds+ (T   2) + 2(T   2)Cu (88)
where Cu  (
ku
2
 u0)2
T 2 may be any non-negative constant. Setting this equal to type x(a)
0s truth-
telling disutility (evaluate (87) at  = x(a)), using u2(a) = k   (T   2)a   u1(a) (from (86)); and
solving for u1(a); u2(a); we obtain
u1(a) =
ku
2
  T   2
2
a pT   2
s
Cu +
ku
2
a  a(x(a) + 1)  T   2
4
a2 +
Z a
0
(s+ 1)x0(s)ds(89)
=
ku
2
  T   2
2
a pT   2
s
Cu +
ku
2
a  a(g(a) + 1)  T   2
4
a2 +
Z a
0
(s+ 1)g0(s)ds
with u2(a) = ku   (T   2)a  u1(a): Evaluating this at x(a) = 3 + a  3ea and ku2 = K + 3 gives
precisely our expression u1(a; a) in (16) evaluated at a = 12 ; the expressions in (16) ; (17) were
rescaled(via the coe¢ cients on the square roots) such that both disutility and average actions
are independent of a:
Now, for our S.O.C.s: di¤erentiating (83) w.r.t. 0 gives
1
2
dDu(
0j)
d0
= u01(
0)
 
u1(
0)  0   1+ u02(0)  u2(0)  0   1  (T   2)| {z }
=0 by (84)
+(0   ) u01(0) + u02(0) + T   2| {z }
= d
d0 (u1(
0)+u2(0)+(T 2)0)
This implies that a su¢ cient condition for truth-telling to indeed yield a minimum on disutility is
that the average action induced by each type ; u1()+u2()+(T  2); be increasing: in this case,
dDu(
0j)
d0 is positive for any 
0 >  (as type  contemplates mimicking types 0 further above him,
disutility increases, making him worse o¤), and negative for 0 <  (as he moves further below the
truth, disutility increases, also making him worse o¤), but zero at 0 =  : thus, telling the truth is
better than mimicking any other type in the interval.
To sum up, this has shown that given arbitrary interval endpoints 1; 2; 3; functions x :
[a1; 0] ! [0; 1] and g : [a1; 0] ! [2; 3]; and with a1  ln g(a1) x(a1)g(0) x(0) = ln 2 13 0 and g(a)  x(a) =
3e
a; if we want an equilibrium in which types x(a); g(a) recommend u1(a) for one period, then
u2(a) for one period, then separate and reveal the truth, then truth-telling satises the F.O.C. for
disutility minimization i¤ u1; u2 are as specied by (89) and u2(a) = ku   (T   2)a   u1(a): If
we additionally impose the requirement that average action be increasing in type, then we satisfy
also the S.O.C.s: this requires that each of x0(a); g0(a) is either negative or  1: Analogously, for
arbitrary functions z : [a ; 0] ! [1; 2]; h : [a ; 0] ! [3; 1b ]; with a = ln h(a) z(a)h(0) z(0) = 3 21
b
 1 and
h(a)   z(a) = (1b   1)ea; if we want an equilibrium in which types z(a); h(a) recommend v1(a)
for T 2 periods, then v2(a) for
T 
2 periods, then separate and reveal the truth, the F.O.C.s for
truth-telling to minimize disutility yield the following equations:
v1(a) =
kv
2
  
T    a 
r
2
T   
s
Cv +
kv
2
a  a(h(a) + 1)  
2(T   )a
2 +
Z a
0
(s+ 1)h0(s)ds (90)
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with v2(a) = kv   2T  a  v1(a); kv and Cv constants. And the S.O.C.s, guaranteeing that truth-
telling indeed yields a disutility minimum over the interval, reduce to the requirement that each
of z0(a); h0(a) is either negative or  1: The proof that no expert type wishes to deviate after the
initial recommendation follows almost trivially from the prescribed strategies.
It remains to show that no expert type wishes to mimic the initial recommendation of any
type from any other interval. This reduces to the additional requirements that at each endpoint
i 2 f1; 2; 3g; the average action is non-decreasing at i (if discontinuous), and type i is in-
di¤erent between the two sequences that he can induce. Our construction chooses the specic
parametrizations g(a) = 3 +a and h(a) = 1b +a, with x(a) = g(a) 3ea; z(a) = h(a)  (1b  1)ea:
Then we have x0(a) = 1  3ea  1  3e 2; z0(a) = 1  2ea a   1; and g0(a) = h0(a) = 1; which
clearly satisfy the S.O.C.s (provided that 3e 2  2; we in fact will restrict to 3e 2  8): With
this, the expressions in (89) ; (90) become (with K  ku2   3)
u1(a) = K + 3   T   2
2
a pT   2
r
Cu +Ka  T
4
a2 (91)
v1(a) =
kv
2
  
T    a 
r
2
T   
s
Cv +

kv
2
  1
b

a  T
2(T   )a
2 (92)
We chose a1 =  2 and g0(a) = 1 because this is in fact the only way that the indi¤erence constraint
at 2 can hold simultaneously with both the indi¤erence constraint at 3; and the increasing-
average-action requirement at 2: We chose h0(a) = 1 just for simplicity. With it, the remaining
increasing-average-action constraints do not bind, and the indi¤erence conditions reduce to the
following requirements on the relationships between kv; Cv;  (parameters from the vt-functions)
and ku; Cu; T (parameters from the ut-functions):
kv
2   3 = 2K+aT 
Cv =
(T 2)Cu
 +
T  2

K2 2Ka T2 a2
(T )

T 2 =  =
(2 1)(2 1 2)
( 1
b
 1)( 1b 1 2)
(93)
With this, the expressions in (91) ; (92) simplify exactly to the expressions for u1(a; a) in (16) and
v1(a; 0) in (18) ; at a = 12 ; 0 =
T 
4 ; in Proposition D3, we then rescaled (16) ; (18) for other
values of a; 0 in such a way that incentives were not a¤ected.
D.3.2 For the decision-maker:
Suppose the decision-maker receives the recommendation u1(a; a) in period 1. If he assigns prob-
abilities (pa; 1   pa) to types x(a); g(a); then his disutility from following all recommendations
is
pa

2a (u1(a; a)  x(a))2 + 2(1  a) (u2(a; a)  x(a))2

+(1  pa)

2a (u1(a; a)  g(a))2 + 2(1  a) (u2(a; a)  g(a))2

Substituting in the expression for u1(a; a),u2(a; a) from (16) ; (17) ; and expanding, this becomes
2pa

K + 3   T   2
2
a  x(a)
2
+2(1 pa)

K + 3   T   2
2
a  g(a)
2
+2(T 2)Cu+2(T 2)a

K   T
4
a

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The best possible deviation is to choose the myopically optimal action pax(a) + (1  pa)g(a) in all
T periods, resulting in disutility
Tpa (pax(a) + (1  pa)g(a)  x(a))2 + T (1  pa) (pax(a) + 1  pa)g(a)  g(a))2
= Tpa(1  pa) (g(a)  x(a))2
Therefore, incentive compatibility of our strategies for the decision-maker refers that the following
expression (the gain to deviating at fx(a); g(a)g) be weakly negative for all a 2 [ 2; 0] :
2pa

K + 3   T   2
2
a  x(a)
2
+ 2(1  pa)

K + 3   T   2
2
a  g(a)
2
(94)
+2(T   2)Cu + 2(T   2)a

K   T
4
a

  Tpa(1  pa) (g(a)  x(a))2
Substituting in g(a) = 3 + a; x(a) = 3 + a  3ea and solving for K; we obtain that the decision-
makers gain to deviating at information set fx(a); g(a)g is negative if and only if
K 2
h
a  pa3ea  
p
T   2(a); a  pa3ea +
p
T   2(a)
i
(95)
where (a) 
r
1
2
pa(1  pa) (3ea)2 + pa (3aea)  a
2
2
  Cu
For there to exist a value of K which satises this expression, we need (a) to be real-valued, i.e.
the term in square roots must be positive; at a =  2; this holds i¤
pa 2
243e 2   4
2(3e 2)
  1
2
s
3e 2   8
3e 2
;
3e
 2   4
2(3e 2)
+
1
2
s
3e 2   8
3e 2
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which in turn is possible (for some belief system) to satisfy only if 3  8e2: For our construction,
with g0 = h0 = 1; this corresponds to
a = ln
3   2
1
b   1
= ln
2
 a + 2 + 3e 2   1:7726, b 
1
60:885
That is, it is possible to satisfy the decision-maker IC constraints in a straightforward manner only
if the bias satises b  160:885 ; which is why our construction species b < 161 :
Similarly, if the decision-maker receives the recommendation v1(a) in period 1 and assigns
probabilities qa; 1  qa to types z(a); h(a); his maximum gain to deviating is
qa

20 (v1(a; 0)  z(a))2 + (T      20) (v2(a; 0)  z(a))2

+(1  qa)

20 (v1(a; 0)  h(a))2 + (T      20) (v2(a; 0)  h(a))2

  Tqa(1  qa) (h(a)  z(a))2
Recalling that the expressions in (18) ; (19) were scaled to make the above expression independent
of 0; we can without loss of generality set 0 = 1; in which case v1 is given by (92) ; and v2 =
kv   2T  a   v1; substituting into the above expression for the decision-makers gain to deviating,
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we obtain
(T   )
 
qa

kv
2
  
T    a  z
2
+ (1  qa)

kv
2
  
T    a  h
2!
+ 2Cv
+2a

kv
2
  1
b
  T
2(T   )a

  Tqa(1  qa)(h  z)2 (96)
Setting h(a) = 1b + a; z(a) =
1
b + a  (1b   1)ea = 1b + a  2ea a and solving for kv2 ; we obtain that
the decision-makers gain to deviating at fz(a); h(a)g is negative if and only if
kv
2
2
"
1
b
+ a  qa
 
2ea a
 r 2
T   
e(a); 1
b
+ a  qa
 
2ea a

+
r
2
T   
e(a)#
where e(a)  r1
2
qa(1  qa)(2ea a )2 + qa (2aea a )  a
2
2
  Cv
This constraint by itself is problematic. To understand the di¢ culty, note that at a = a ; there
exists a value of kv satisfying the above expression only if e(a) is real-valued, requiring
2qa(1  qa + a) 
a2
2
  Cv  0
We showed in the previous paragraph that the IC constraints at information sets of the form
fx(a); g(a)g can only hold if a   1:7726; in this case, the rst term in the above inequality
is negative (since we need qa  0 and 1 + a < 0); the second term is clearly negative, and the
third must be negative (i.e. we need Cv  0) in order for the functions v1; v2to be real-valued at
a = 0: Therefore, if the decision-maker nds it optimal to follow all recommendations sent by pairs
fx(a); g(a)g; then he necessarily will have an incentive to deviate if his information set contains
only types fz(a); h(a)g = f2; 3g: To solve this problem, we will bunch pairs - scaling our
action functions such that whenever the decision-maker would have an incentive to deviate after a
recommendation v1 sent by a pair fz(a); h(a)g; he believes that the recommendation is also sent
(for the same length of time) by a pair fx(a0); g(a0)g; and such that the expected benet to following
the recommendation (likelihood that it was sent by the pair (x(a0); g(a0)); times the gain in this
case) exceeds the cost (which is the likelihood that it was sent by pair (z(a); h(a)); times the cost
in this case).
D.3.3 Decision-maker Beliefs
Our incentive constraints for the DM were specied in terms of arbitrary probabilities pa; qa; which
in turn depend both on his prior F , and on the precise details of our construction. As explained in
Section 4, we assume that the DM is Bayesian. For our construction, (5) becomes:
 after a message (or message sequence) sent by types fx(a); g(a)g; a 2 [ 2; 0] :
pa
1  pa 
Pr(x(a))
Pr(g(a))
=
f (x(a))
f (g(a))

x0(a)g0(a)
 = f (x(a))f (g(a)) (3ea   1)
 after a message (or message sequence) sent by types fz(a); h(a)g; a 2 [a ; 0] :
qa
1  qa 
Pr(z(a)
Pr(h(a)
=
f (z(a))
f (h(a))

 z0(a)h0(a)
 = f (z(a))f (h(a))(2ea a   1)
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 and, after a message sent by types fz(a); h(a); x (ba(a)) ; g (ba(a))g; with u1 (ba(a)ba) = v1(a; 0) :
Pr(x(ba(a)))
Pr(z(a))
=
f(x(ba))
f (z(a))

x0 (ba))z0(a)
  ba0(a)
so, denoting bI(ba) = fx(ba); g(ba)g and I(a) = fz(a); h(a)g; the decision-makers beliefs at the
pooled (4-type) information set bI(ba) [ I(a) satisfy
P 
1  P  
Pr(bI(ba))
Pr(I(a))
=
Pr(x(ba))  1 + Pr(g(ba))Pr(x(ba))
Pr(z(a)) 

1 + Pr(h(a)Pr(z(a)

=
f(x(ba))
f (z(a))

 
3e
ba(a)   1
2ea a   1
!ba0(a)   qa
pba

(with pa; qa as dened in the rst two bullet points).
E Proof of Proposition 4
To prove that the decision-makers incentive constraints are relaxed as he becomes more patient,
thus completing the proof of Proposition 4, it su¢ ces to prove that the time ratio terms in
(7) ; (8) ; and (9)are increasing in rDM (so that a decrease in rDM below rE causes a decrease in
the expressions, thus making deviations even less attractive). For future reference, recall that our
parameter outline in Section D.2.1 specied T     4; 20  2a; and T  6 : by (6) ; this implies
t1(0)  t2(a)  t3 = 1
rE
ln

1
1  2rE

; t4  1
rE
ln

1
1  4rE

; and bT  1
rE
ln

1
1  6rE

(97)
Now: to prove that
R t1(0)
0 e
 rDM dtR bT
0 e
 rDM dt

and
R t2(a)
0 e
 rDM dtR bT
0 e
 rDM dt

are increasing in r; we will show
that ddr
 R t
0 e
 rtdtR T
0 e
 rtdt

> 0 for any t < T (so, by (97) ; this in particular holds at t 2 ft1(0); t2(a)g
and T = bT ): We have,
d
dr

1  e rt
1  e rT

=
 
1  e rT  te rt   Te rT  1  e rt
(1  e rT )2 = (T   t)e
 r(T+t) 1 

Tert terT
T t

(1  e rT )2 :
This is positive whenever

Tert terT
T t

< 1; and since ddr

Tert terT
T t

= Tt(T t)
 
ert   erT  < 0 for t <
T; it follows that the term

Tert terT
T t

is decreasing in r; hence maximized at r = 0; where it exactly
equals 1; for any r > 0; the term

Tert terT
T t

is strictly below 1, implying that ddr

1 e rt
1 e rT

> 0;
as desired.
Next, we prove that
 R t4
t1(0)
e r
DM
dtR bT
t1(0)
e rDM dt
!
is increasing in e rDM : We have,
d
dr

e rt1   e rt4
e rt1   e r bT

=
(T   t4)e r(T+t4) + (t4   t1)e r(t4+t1)   (T   t1)e r(T+t1)
e rt1   e r bT2
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We want to show that this expression is positive 8r > 0: Suppose, by contradiction, that it is
negative: then,
(T   t4)
(T   t1)e
 r(T+t4) +
(t4   t1)
(T   t1) e
 r(t4+t1)   e r(T+t1) < 0 (98)
The derivative of the LHS of this expression w.r.t. r, divided by (T + t1); is
 

T   t4
T   t1

T + t4
T + t1

e r(T+t4)  

t4   t1
T   t1

t4 + t1
T + t1

e r(t4+t1) + e r(T+t)
Substituting in e r(T+t1) > (T t4)(T t1)e
 r(T+t4) + (t4 t1)(T t1) e
 r(t4+t1) from (98) ; and factoring, we obtain
that this is greater than 
T   t4
T   t1

(t4   t1)
(T   t1)

e r(t4+t1)   e r(t4+T )

which is strictly positive 8r > 0 by t1 < t4 < T . That is, the LHS of (98) is increasing in r
whenever it is negative; therefore, if it is negative at some br > 0; it is also negative for all r < br:
So, in particular, (98) can only hold for some br > 0 if it also holds strictly at r = 0; but since this
is in fact not the case the LHS of (98) is exactly zero at r = 0 we conclude that (98) cannot
hold for any r > 0: Therefore, as desired, we have that ddr

e rt1 e rt4
e rt1 e r bT

> 0 8r > 0:
And nally, to prove that
R t4
t1(0)
e r
DM
dtR bT
0 e
 rDM dt
and
R t3
t2(a)
e r
DM
dtR bT
0 e
 rDM dt
are increasing in rDM ; we will show
that the condition ddr
R t+
t e
 rdR bT
0 e
 rd

> 0 becomes more di¢ cult to satisfy as r; t; t+ increase, and
easier to satisfy as bT increases: so, it is su¢ cient to prove that the inequality holds if we replace
r; t; t+ with upper bounds, and bT with a lower bound. We specically need ddr R t+t e rdR bT
0 e
 rd

> 0
to hold for (t; t + ) 2 f(t1(0); t4); (t2(a); t3)), T = bT ; and r  rE ; which gives the upper
bounds (by (97)) r = rE ; t = 1
rE
ln

1
1 2rE

; and t +  = 1
rE
ln

1
1 4rE

; and the lower boundbT = 1
rE
ln

1
1 TrE

 1
rE
ln

1
1 6rE

:
To this end, we di¤erentiate
R t+
t e
 rdR bT
0 e
 rd
=

e rt e r(t+)
1 e r bT

; obtaining
d
dr

e rt e r(t+)
1 e r bT

= (1  e r bT )(t+ )e r(t+)   te rt  bTe rT e rt   e r(t+)
> 0 whenever
bT
(er bT   1) <
(t+ ) ert   ter(t+)
er(t+)   ert (99)
We rst show that this becomes harder to satisfy as r increases. We have,
d
dr
 
t+   ter
er   1  
bT
(erT   1)
!
=  2 e
r
(er   1)2 +
bT 2 ebTr
ebTr   12
< 0 whenever er
bT   bT

e(
T+
2 )r +
bT

e
 bT 
2

r   1 > 0(100)
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The derivative of the LHS of (100) w.r.t. r; setting   bT , is
1
2
er(
 1
2 )

2er(
+1
2 ) + (  1)  (+ 1) er

:
This is positive for any r > 0; since the bracketed term equals zero at r = 0; and is increasing
in r (the derivative is  (+ 1) er

er(
 1
2 )   1

; which is positive by  =
bT
 > 1): That is,
the LHS of the expression in (100) is increasing in r; and since it is exactly equal to zero at
r = 0; we conclude that (100) holds: that is, our desired inequality (99) becomes harder to satisfy
as r increases. Also, t+ te
r
er 1 is decreasing in both t and  (since
d
dt

t+ ter
er 1

=  1; and
d
d

t+ ter
er 1

=
((1 r)er 1)
(er 1)2 ; which is negative: the denominator is positive, and the numerator
is decreasing in r (derivative w.r.t. r is  r2er) with a maximum value, at r = 0; of zero).
So, it is su¢ cient to prove that (99) holds at r = rE ; t = 1
rE
ln

1
1 2rE

; t+ = 1
rE
ln

1
1 4rE

;bT = 1
rE
ln

1
1 TrE

(where T is the horizon from the original construction; recall that Section D.2.1
species T  6) : here, (99) becomes
1
rE
ln

1
1 TrE

e
ln

1
1 TrE

  1
<
1
rE
ln

1
1 4rE

e
ln

1
1 2rE

  1
rE
ln

1
1 2rE

e
ln

1
1 4rE

e
ln

1
1 4rE

  eln

1
1 2rE
 (101)
, 2
T
 
1  TrE ln  1  TrE   1  4rE ln  1  4rE+ (1  2rE) ln  1  2rE > 0
Note that the LHS of (101) exactly equals zero at rE = 0; so, to show that (101) holds 8rE > 0;
we just need to show that the LHS expression is increasing in rE : To this end, note that
d2
d(rE)2

2
T
 
1  TrE ln  1  TrE   1  4rE ln  1  4rE+ (1  2rE) ln  1  2rE
=
2
 
T   6 + 8rE
(1  TrE) (4rE   1) (2rE   1)
This is positive (by T  6 and 2rE < 4rE < TrE < 1); and therefore the rst derivative w.r.t.
r of the LHS of (101) reaches a minimum at r = 0; where it equals zero. We conclude that the
LHS of (101) is increasing in rE , therefore strictly positive for any rE 2 (0; 1T ); as desired.
This completes the proof that all incentive constraints for the decision-maker are relaxed as
he becomes more patient; therefore, our modied timeline yields a fully revealing equilibrium (for
some priors) for any rDM  rE :
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